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AGAINST EMPLOYER DUMPSTER-DIVING FOR EMAIL
Michael Z. Green
Recent attorney client-privilege cases ojfer a modern understanding of
reasonable expectations of employee privacy in the digital age. Today
employees are sending an increasing number of electronic mail communications
to their attorneys via employer-provided computers or other digital devices with
an expectation of privacy and confidentiality. Historically, courts summarily
dispensed with these matters by finding that an employer' policy establishing
employer ownership of any communications made through employer-provided
devices eliminated any employee expectation of privacy in the communications
and waived any viable privacy challenges to employer review of those
communications. Nevertheless, within the last couple of years, several cases
involving employee assertions of attorney-client-privilege protection in emails
sent on employer-provided devices suggest new thoughts about reasonable
workplace privacy expectations.
As employees must communicate through employer-provided digital devices,
day and night, these attorney-client-privilege cases help expose the fallacy of
assuming employees cannot reasonably expect that emails will remain private if
employers'policies mandate that such communications are not private. These
new cases and related ethics opinions about privileged email offer a modern lens
through which one may now view employee privacy expectations under a new
paradigm that replaces the fagade of assuming employees have no expectation of
privacy due to employer policies.
Digital-age expectations regarding employee use of "smart" cellular
phones, portable laptops, and other employer-provided electronic devices to
communicate beyond standard work hours leaves little expectation or
reasonable opportunity for employees to communicate privately and
confidentially by any other means. 4s a result, this 4rticle asserts that employer
ejjfbrts to mine employer-provided devices for employee emails, after disputes
arise, comprises a form of electronic dumpster-diving that should not be
tolerated by courts, legislatures, or attorney ethics committees.
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1. INTRODUCTION: INCREASING MERGER OF PERSONAL AND WORK-RELATED
COMMUNICATIONS WITH ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Imagine the following scenario:
Bobbi works for Acme as Vice President for Sales and reports to the
President, Henry. Despite her extensive travel schedule, Acme expects
Bobbi to remain in contact with her staff, as well as with Henry, on a
daily basis, including outside normal work hours, as needed. Bobbi has
filed a complaint of sexual harassment against Henry, which will be
heard in arbitration. Bobbi communicated with her attorney via emails
sent through her employer-provided smart phone, and the emails were
downloaded to her company laptop computer. A computer forensics
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expert from Acme searched the laptop computer while Bobbi was at a
meeting and found several emails from Bobbi to her attorney. Acme's
computer use policy states that all communications found on employer-
provided equipment are the property of Acme and Acme may inspect
the equipment and communications made on it at any time. Acme's
attorneys want to use the emails in the arbitration against Bobbi because
they are the property of Acme when found on Acme's computer.
However, Bobbi's attorney asserts the emails contain protected,
confidential, and attorney-client-privileged communications.'
This scenario illustrates the difficult issues that have arisen as technological
advances create more opportunities and necessities to merge personal and work-
related electronic communications. Whether Bobbi may successfully assert that
the emails found on her employer-provided computer are privileged depends on
the reasonableness of her belief that the communications were private and
confidential. Ultimately, this issue will be decided by comparing the steps Bobbi
and her attorney took to keep the communications confidential with whatever
steps her employer took to inform her that Acme agents would be accessing and
viewing information on the computer.'
1. Portions of this scenario were derived from the facts presented for a petition for review to
the Supreme Court of California. Petition for Review at 2-3, Shanahan v. Superior Court, No.
S185493, 2010 WL 3799960 (Cal. Aug. 31, 2010). For a broad discussion of many privacy issues
generated by the expansion of technology, see JON L. MILLS. PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT (2008):
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY
(2011); CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY (1999). Given the growth of technology,
concerns related to the attorney client privilege have also expanded. See generally Anne
Klinefelter, When to Research Is to Reveal: The Growing Threat to Attorney and Client
Confidentialty from Online Tracking, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1. 22-30 (2011) (discussing the
expansion of online legal research with respect to attorney client privilege).
2. See William A. Herbert. The Electronic Workplace: To Live Outside the Law You Must
Be Honest. 12 Eli. RTS. & Eli. POL'Y J. 49, 50 (2008) (describing the merger of personal and
work-related electronic communications); see also Marian K. Riedy et al., Mfanaging Business
Snartphone Data, J. INTERNET L., Mar. 2011, at 3, 9 (describing the increasing use of smart phones
by employees for both personal and business use and suggesting that employees who use their
personal smart phones for business use may have some privacy protection in personal emails used
on those phones).
3. In August 2011, the American Bar Association (ABA), in ain effort to address the concern
that employees may realistically expect to communicate with their attorneys via email and whether
those email communications may represent a loss of the attorney client privilege, issued two ethics
opinions. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & ProfI Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011)
[hereinafter ABA Opinion 11-459] (discussing a lawyer's duty to protect the confidentiality of
email communications with clients): ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility. Formal Op.
11-460 (2011) [hereinafter ABA Opinion 11-460] (discussing a lawyer's duty when receiving a
third party's email communication with counsel). Both opinions establish ain attorney's duty to
protect the attorney client privilege by making sure those employees keep email communications
confidential and not use employer-provided devices to make those email communications. These
ethics opinions seem pragmatic in responding to a potential loss of privilege under various state
laws by placing more burdens on attorneys to recognize the risk of email communications from
2012]
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This Article asserts that the growth of mobile technology in the workplace
and the increasing expectation that employees be available electronically
supports the position that employees reasonably expect their personal
communications-those that are not work-related-will remain private, even if
those communications are made and stored on employer-provided electronic
devices. Employees would not repeatedly communicate with their attorneys
through employer-provided devices if those employees did not reasonably expect
that those communications would remain private and confidential. After being
forced to spend so much of their time and energy working and communicating
through employer-provided digital devices, it is only reasonable to expect that
employees will make both personal and private communications through those
devices.
The expansion of electronically stored information (ESI) in the digital age
has created key issues and demands for employers and employees in
investigating and resolving workplace disputes. A 2011 Aberdeen Group study
of 415 companies found that 75% of those companies allowed their employees to
use personal devices to perform work-related activities. Whether it is
reasonable to expect privacy in information that has been disclosed or made
available to an employer represents a more difficult question in the digital age.
Because of the pervasiveness and ease of sending electronic information,
questions about whether members of society have given up privacy rights as an
"inevitable" compromise to the expediency of electronic communication have
posed knotty dilemmas for the courts.6 Ultimately, legislative action may have
clients. On the other hand, these ethics opinions also highlight how employees expect that email
communications made to their attorneys on employer-provided devices will remain private. See
ABA Opinion 11-459, supra; ABA Opinion 11-460, supra.
4. See James K. Robertson Jr. & Charles F. Corcoran 111, The Discovery of Electronically
Stored Information in Arbitration Proceedings, in E-DISCOVERY IN ARBITRATION: LEADING
LAWYERS ON RECOVERING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, MEETING NEW DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES.
AND IMPLEMENTING MEASURES TO STREAMLINE THE PROCESS 7. 8 (2010) ("In 2009, computers
[were] the primary medium for the development, maintenance, and communication of
information .... The vast majority of all business records [were] generated and stored
electronically. most never appearing in hard copy."); see also Rodney A. Satterwhite & Matthew J.
Quatrara, Asymmetrical 1'arfare: The Cost of Electronic Discovery in Employment Litigation, 14
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, at 3 (2008), http://law.richmond.edijolt/v 4i3/article9.pdf (highlighting the
difficulties for employers who have "significantly larger volumes of EST in their possession that
may be relevant to the litigation" including "electronic mail messages regarding the employee
[which] are more likely to be kept on the employer's server").
5. See Dave Zielinski, Bring Your Own Device: More Enplovers Are 4lloiing Emnployees
to Use Their Own Technology in the Wf'orkplace, HR TAG., Feb. 2012. at 71 (citing Enterprise-
Grade BYOD Strategies: Flexible, Compliant. Secure, ABERDEEN GROUTP 1, 1 (Sept. 2011)
[hereinafter Enterprise-Grade], http://fm.sap.com/data/UPLOAD/files/Enterprise Grade BYOD
Strategies 2012.4.11-18.52.49.pdf) (describing the increasing number of employers who are
allowing employees to use their own mobile, digital devices to perform work duties).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Jones. 132 S. Ct 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in
judgment) ("New technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of
privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does not
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to address the impact of digital devices on privacy rights.7 Until any responsible
legislative action occurs, this Article asserts that courts should recognize that
employees do reasonably expect privacy in email communications, especially
those made to their attorneys. This expectation of privacy does not change even
if the employer has provided the digital device used or the employer clearly has
access to review the communications on that device.
Attorney-client-privilege law offers a modern lens through which one can
analyze employee expectations in digital communications.8  When an attorney
becomes involved in the investigation of a legal matter, ethical rules guide the
attorney's conduct in deciding whether to use inadvertently discovered electronic
communications. 9 If an employee chooses to communicate with the employee's
lawyer through a work computer, the question arises as to whether that
communication remains protected by the attorney-client privilege or whether the
privilege has been waived because the employee used a device the employer can
access to review those communications.10 When an attorney receives an
welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile
themselves to this development as inevitable.").
7. Id. at 962-63 ("Concern about the new intrusions on privacy may spur the enactment of
legislation to protect against these intrusions" similar to what occurred "with respect to
wiretapping," a subject to which "Congress did not leave it to the courts" but "promptly enacted a
comprehensive statute.").
8. See generally Louise L. Hill, Gone but Not Forgotten: 4hen Privacy, Policy and
Privilege Collide, 9 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 565, 572-81 (2011) (describing attorney client
issues related to workplace expectations of privacy in email communications from employees to
attorneys). But see Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Dangerous Trend Blurring the Distinction
Between a Reasonable Expectation of Coifidentiality in Privilege Law; and a Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 57 Lov. L. REV. , 22 28 (2011)
(asserting that key distinctions exist between confidentiality expectations under privilege law and
expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment-the analysis for one area of expectations
should not be confused with the other).
9. Se Liouise L Hill, Emerging Technolog and iCnt Confaatialty liowC
Technoogy Brings Etha )irnmas, 16 BU J SCI & iECII L. 1, 21-45 (210); Robert L A. Zito,
Sop. The Lawvers I 1 hical Dut o )iscoverr finverten Dirsclosed Confidenial Information,
NY. L.J., May 2r 'Y,008 at S6-S /, S 0: see also John D. Comerford. Notr Competent Conputing:
A Lawr's Ethical Dut to Sfeguard the Conideniait and Ic nteriy of Clni Infrmation Stored
On Computers, and ompuer NeOrirks, 19 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 629, 630 (2006) (citing Ariz.
State Rar Ass'n, Comm. or tie Ruls ofProf 'onduct Frmal Op 2 ) gung that th e
Arizona Opinion "oflrs a sold framework for, avycrs and law firms seekig advice regardirg their
ethical responsibilities in this ae"
10. See Hill, supra note 8, at 565 (finding that "jurisdictions are divided about whether
employees give up the protection of attorney-client privilege when they use a company-issued
computer to send or receive e-mails"); see also Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d
436, 438-43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (finding an employee's emails to an attorney were not privileged
communications when sent from employer-owned computers where the corporation banned
personal use of employer provided devices, the company monitored the use of the employee's
computer and email, and the employee was aware of the use and monitoring policies of the
company). But see Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 973 A.2d 390, 402 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2009) (finding that ain employees communications to her attorney on her personal email
account were protected by the attorney client privilege even though they were made using the
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inadvertent disclosure of information and can clearly see that it was not intended
to be disclosed because it represents a confidential communication between an
opposing party and an attorney, the receiving attorney may have different
obligations depending upon the ethical rules in that jurisdiction. The receiving
attorney could certainly ask a court to rule that any attorney-client privilege has
been waived under the circumstances.
Neither the law nor ethical rules clearly discourage diving into dumpsters1
to retrieve confidential communications between an opposing party and that
party's attorney. If the communications could have been easily protected from
disclosure before going in the trash, a court may disregard the dumpster-diving
retrieval and find the privilege was waived.14  The American Bar Association
employer's computer and with knowledge of the company's computer use policy), aff'd as
modified, 990 A.2d 650 (N.J 20 10).
11. See Paula Schaefer. The Future ofInadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need to Revise
Professional Conduct Rules, 69 MD. L. REv. 195, 206-08 (2010).
12. Dumpster-diving, as that term is used in this Article, refers to attempts to obtain private
and confidential information clearly not intended to be viewed by others. The term encompasses
physically searching trash receptacles as well as electronically searching email files that may be
accessible for some reason other than for the purpose of being searched-like being stored on a
company-owned computer or server or being accessed through a company-owned computer or
server. See Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-First Century
Framework for Employee Mlonitoring, 48 AM. Bus. L.J. 285, 316-17 (2011) ( "Dumpster diving"'
is "a rather drastic form of employee monitoring" where "employers physically search through
employees' trash and recycled materials, looking for information" that employees have not
shredded or destroyed.); Jason Fitterer, Comment, Putting a Lid on Online Dumpster-Diving: Why
the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act Should Be Amended to Include E-mail Receipts, 9
Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 591, 597 (2011) ("Today's [d]umpster is the Internet, and the
amount of personal information that litters the information superhighway is incredible." (quoting
Drew Voros, Your Online Privacy Slips Through Wi'eb's Cracks, OAKLAND TRIB., Oct. 19, 2010.
available at NewsBank, Rec. No. 16378229) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13. See Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bemina. Inc.. 91 F.R.D. 254, 255-56, 260-61
(N.D. 111. 1981) (finding that a party, who searched the trash dumpsters of a competitor for evidence
of price discrimination and found several drafts of letters intended by the competitor to be
confidential communications to attorneys, could use those communications because any privilege
was waived by not taking simple precautions to protect the confidentiality of the communications
when placing them in the trash dumpster); see also Harry Wingo, Comment, Dumpster Diving and
the Ethical Blindspot of Trade Secret Law, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 195. 213-15 (1997) (arguing
that industrial espionage and dumpster-diving by digging into a competitor's trash receptacles to
discover confidential information should represent unethical and "sleazy" behavior even if these
activities receive little condemnation in the courts): Sasha Smith, Spying: How Far Is Too Far?
WVhat You Should Know Before Diving in a Dumpster or Cracking a Safe, FORTUNE SMALL BUS.,
June 1, 2001, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fsb/fsb archive/2001/06/01/304095/
index.htm (referring to the act of dumpster-diving as "unseemly" while noting that the practice is
not illegal in most states).
14. Suburban Sei 'N Sweep, 91 F.R.D. at 260 ("The likelihood that third parties will have
the interest, ingenuity, perseverance and stamina, as well as risk possible criminal and civil
sanctions, to search through mounds of garbage in hopes of finding privileged communications, and
that they will then be successful, is not sufficiently great to deter open attorney-client
communication.... [I]f the client or attorney fear such disclosure, [the disclosure] may be
prevented by destroying the documents or rendering them unintelligible before placing them in a
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(ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) and ABA ethics
opinions also do not clearly prohibit an attorney from dumpster-diving for
written or electronic communications. Nor do the Model Rules require that an
attorney wait to have a court rule that any privilege attached to the
communications has been waived before using the communications.16
Further, the ethics rules appear more concerned with defining
responsibilities when information has been inadvertently disclosed rather than
when an employer goes trawling through the garbage or emails of an employee
in an attempt to find private and privileged communications. 8  Accordingly,
when an employee accesses his own private email service and makes privileged
communications, it does not appear to be an inadvertent disclosure when an
employer later accesses those communications by examining an employer-
provided device.19 When employers search an employee's computer and find
attorney-client privileged or other private communications made by employees,
trash dumpster."). But see Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 n.8 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (suggesting the question ofwhether privilege has been waived should focus on the motives of
the party whose information was retrieved to determine whether the information was intended to be
disclosed-a position contrary to the holding in Suburban Sew 'N Sweep).
15. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006),
reprinted in ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: ETHICS OPINIONS
2006-2010. at 1301:101 (2006) [hereinafter ABA Opinion 06-442] ("The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct do not contain any specific prohibition against a lawyer's reviewing and using
embedded information in electronic documents, whether received from opposing counsel, an
adverse party, or an agent of an adverse party. A lawyer [can readily remove any concerns about
this form of dissemination] by 'scrubbing' metadata [(the embedded information)] from documents
or by sending a different version of the document without the embedded information."); see also
infra Part IV.E F (discussing ABA Opinion 11-459 and ABA Opinion 1 1-460). A majority of
states that have adopted ethics opinions regarding the use of metadata have not agreed with the
ABA and, instead, have found that an employ er's attorney may not look at the metadata. See
fetadata Ethics Opinions Around the US., Am. BAR ASS'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/depart
ments offices/legal tecinology resources/resources/charts fy is/metadatachart.html (last visited Oct.
21, 2012) (tracking jurisdictions that have issued ethics opinions regarding the use of metadata
similar to ABA Opinion 06-442 and finding seventeen jurisdictions with decisions-nine
jurisdictions have found it unethical for the attorney to mine the metadata and use it (Alabama,
Arizona. Florida. Maine, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Washington, D.C., and West
Virginia), six jurisdictions have agreed that attorneys may mine and use the metadata (Colorado,
Maryland, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin), and two jurisdictions have refused to
establish a bright line rule (Minnesota and Pennsylvania)). But see Michael B. de Leeuw & Eric A.
Hirsch. Time to Revisit the Ethics of lletadata, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 19, 2012, at S1O (quoting ROY D.
SIMON, SIMON's NEW YORK RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ANNOTATED 220 (2012))
(asserting that New York lawyers are disadvantaged by the New York rule not being consistent with
the ABA Model Rules and contending that New York should adopt the ABA's approach to the use
of document metadata).
16. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) & cmt. 2 (2011).
17. See id.
18. Id. ("[T]his Rule does not address the legal duties of a lawyer wvho receives a document
that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know may have been wrongfully obtained . '... ).
19. See ABA Opinion 11-460, supra note 3, at 3 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT
R. 1.6 (2011)).
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the law should apply the understanding that employees still expect that these
communications, whether to their attorneys or others, will not be divulged. This
approach faces the realities of the modern, digital workplace by recognizing that
these communications are private and intended to be kept confidential, even if it
is possible for an employer's forensics expert to later retrieve the information.20
Although employees may know, or should know, that people can easily
listen to their cell phone conversations or hack into their computers to retrieve
private communications that go over wireless networks, employees still expect
that those communications will remain private and protected when made to their
attorneys or to others. To some extent, ethical opinions describing the scope of
the attorney-client privilege initially agreed with that privacy expectation.21
Even if employers extract information embedded in digital devices provided to
their employees and find communications to attorneys, that extraction and its
potential use does not change the employees' intent or expectation that those
communications will be kept private and confidential. With this understanding,
the analysis can focus on whether there was a reasonable basis for the intrusion,
instead of encouraging a form of electronic dumpster-diving.
In Part II, this Article examines the current workplace use of digital
communication devices, how those devices have blurred the distinction between
work-related and private communications, and what employees reasonably
expect regarding the privacy of their non-work-related communications. Part III
examines the current status of workplace privacy protections for employees
when they use employer-provided equipment, given the current expansion of
technological advances. Part IV explores the analysis that has developed
regarding attorney-client privilege when employers discover employee
communications with attorneys on employer-provided mobile devices.
Part V of this Article asserts that ongoing issues regarding attorney-client
privilege provide an overall framework for the courts, legislatures, and attorney
ethics committees to accept a new paradigm where it should be assumed that
employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal and private
communications found on employer-provided equipment. This new paradigm
shifts the focus of workplace privacy claims away from whether the employee
had an expectation of privacy and moves toward answering the more important
20. One might consider it unusual for employers to hire computer forensics experts to look
through employee communications on employer-provided devices as part of litigation, but the
number of cases involving these actions appears to be increasing. See Hill, supra note 8, at 578-79
(citing Curto v. Med. World Commc'ns, Inc., 99 FEP Cases 298 (E.DN.Y. 2006); Kaufman v.
SunGard Inv. Sys., No. 05-CV-1236(JLL), 2006 WL 1307882 (D.N.J. May 10, 2006); Banks v.
Mario Indus. of Va., Inc., 650 S.E.2d 687 (Va. 2007)) (describing three separate cases where
employers, in preparing for litigation, hired a computer forensics expert to restore emails and
portions of files created by a former employee).
21. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999). reprinted in
ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: ETHICS OPINIONS 1996-2000. at
1101: 181 (1999) [hereinafter ABA Opinion 99-413] ("[L]awyers have a reasonable expectation of
privacy when communicating by e-mail maintained by an [online service provider].").
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question of whether the employer's intrusion upon that private information was
reasonable. Part VI concludes that courts, legislatures, and attorney ethics
committees must presume that employees can have expectations of privacy in
certain communications made on employer-provided devices and that employer
policies on the use of such devices only help explain the reasonableness of any
intrusion upon employee privacy. This result reflects the existing realities in
worker electronic privacy cases in that it emphasizes whether it was necessary
and reasonable for the employer to access and use the private information in a
particular case, rather than assuming an employee had no expectation of privacy
or consented to waive that expectation of privacy because of an employer's
policy.
11. EMPLOYEE PRIVACY REALITIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE WORKPLACE
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill
suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying
out mundane tasks.
-Justice Sonia Sotomayor, United States Supreme Court22
Technological advancements have long created concerns for employees and
2^their lack of privacy protections. 2 However, recent technological advances in
electronic communication devices have also led to the "decentralization of the
workplace, with some employees integrating their personal computer equipment
with their employer's equipment."24 Because of this integration of information
and decentralization of the workplace, resulting from the use of mobile digital
communication devices, employers can maximize the efficient use of their
25
employees without the restriction of work hours or work location.
22. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
23. See generally Rod Dixon, With -Nowhere to Hide: Workers Are Scrambling for Privacy in
the Digital Age, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y I, para. 9-10 (1999), http://jtlp.org/vol4/issuel/dixon.html
(providing excellent detail and analysis of the "growing presence of surveillance technology" and
the lack of protection for employees' privacy); see also David Beckman & David Hirsch, Security
or Snooping? Monitoring Staff E-mail Is Easy Now, but Privacy May Suffer, 87 A.B.A. J. 72, 72 73
(2001) (recognizing the need for employer monitoring but suggesting a balance so that employee
privacy is still protected).
24. Herbert, supra note 2, at 50; see also Zielinski, supra note 5, at 71 (citing Enterprise-
Grade, supra note 5) (supporting the proposition that many companies have begun to allow
employees to use their personal equipment in the workplace).
25. Herbert, supra note 2, at 50; see also Riedy et al., supra note 2. at 3 (providing examples
that show how employers can maximize employee productivity without restricting work hours or
work location); Zielinski, supra note 5, at 71 (stating that offering choices in work technology can
"[b]oost productivity and satisfaction levels of most employee generations").
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Nevertheless, the merger of work and personal digital communication devices
has not shifted employees' reasonable expectations that their personal
communications will remain private.26
Despite employees' expectation of privacy, the nature of electronic
monitoring of employees has become pervasive. A 2001 American Management
Association (AMA) study found that 77.7% of employers technologically
monitor their employees' emails, phone calls, and computer files. Similarly, a
2007 AMA study found that "66% of employers monitor Internet connections,"
12% of employers monitor blogs, "10% monitor social networking sites," and
8% use global positioning systems (GPS) to monitor company vehicles.28
Another study indicates that "of those employees 'who regularly use e-mail or
Internet access at work,' fourteen million 'are under continuous surveillance."' 29
Moreover, yet another commentator, referring to a 2005 AMA study, noted that
76% of employers are monitoring their employees' web activity.30
The Internet has played a major role in how we all view issues pertaining to
electronic communication, including the expectation of privacy.0  With the
26. Herbert, supra note 2, at 51 (citing Elaine Ki Jin Kim, Comment, The New Electronic
Discovery Rules: A Place for Employee Privacy?, 115 YALE L.J. 1481, 1485 (2006)): see also
Dionne Searcey, Some Courts Raise Bar on Reading Employee Email, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2009,
at A17 ("Employees often assume their communications on personal email accounts should stay
private even if they are using work-issued computers or smart phones."); Matthew J. Schwartz,
CIOs See Smaritphones as Data Breach Tine Bomb, INFORMATIONWEEK (Nov. 19, 2010, 12:35
PM), http://www.informationweek.com/hardware/handheld/cios-see-smartphones-as-data-breach-time!
228300244 (last visited Oct. 23. 2012) (quoting Graham Titterington, principal analyst for Ovum,
for the statement that '[e]mployees will want to use their devices, no matter who owns them, for
both their work and personal lives" and because "[i]t is unrealistic to delineate between these uses
for employees who are mobile and working out of the office for a large part of their time.").
Approximately "70% of employees can currently use corporate-owned computing devices for
personal activities." Id. (citing Graham Titterington, Enterprises Cautiously Embrace Mobile
Devices, OvuM STRAIGHT TALK IT, Q4 2011, at 9, available at http://ovum.com/wp-content/
uploads/2011/10/ST-IT-4Q11.pdf).
27. See Ariana R. Levinson, Industrial Justice: Privacy Protection for the Employed, 18
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 609, 616 (2009) (quoting Matthew W. Finkin, hiaformation Technology
and Workers' Privacv: The Uhited States Law, 23 COMp. LAB. L. & POLY J. 471, 474 (2002))
(citing AM. NIGMIT. ASS'N ET AL., ELECTRONIC POLICIES AND PRACTICES: SUMMARY OF KEY
FINDINGs 1 (2001), available at http://www.epolicy institute.comi/survey2001 Summary.pdf).
28. Id. (quoting Am. MGMT. ASS'N & EPOLICY INST., 2007 ELECTRONIC MONITORING &
SURVEILLANCE SURVEY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2008), available at http://www.epolicyinstitute.
com/survey2007Summary.pdf).
29. Id. (quoting Finkin, supra note 27, at 474) (citing PRIVACY FOUND., THE EXTENT OF
SYSTEMATIC MONITORING OF EMPLOYEE E-MAIL AND INTERNET USE 1 (2001), available at
lttp://65.98.26.50/internetmonitoring.pdt).
30. Mindy C. Calisti, Note, You Are Being Watched: The Need for Notice in Eimployer
Electronic Monitoring, 96 KY. L.J. 649, 650 (2008) (citing Am. MGMT. ASS'N & EPOLICY INST.,
2005 ELECTRONIC MONITORING & SURVEILLANCE SURVEY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2005),
available at http://www.epolicy institute.com/survey2005Summary.pdf).
31. See Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendnent, 96 IoWA L. REV. 581.
611-19 (2011) (focusing on privacy concerns over the Internet but only when viewed by humans, as
opposed to being disclosed to automated systems).
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expansive growth of the information superhighway, employers and employees
have to navigate electronic information issues in the increasingly digital
workplace. In particular, with the pervasive use of laptops, personal digital
assistants (PDAs), pagers, cellular phones, and other mobile devices, an
increasing number of employers are requiring that their employees become
electronically connected beyond just a normal nine-to-five work day. Also,
communications via mobile electronic devices have spread with the proliferation
of "[s]ocial networking [w]eb sites allow[ing] registered users to upload profiles,
post comments, join 'networks,' and add 'friends"' which gives "users the
opportunity to form 'links' between each other, based on friendships, hobbies,
personal interests, and business sector or academic affiliations." 3
As the increasing mandate to be electronically available places more
working demands on employees, this availability requirement also creates
concerns about whether employees have any reasonable expectation of privacy
in the ESI on mobile devices provided by employers. Furthermore, as the nine-
to-five culture of communicating about and performing work matters solely at
the office and limiting private and non-work-related communications to places
and times outside the workplace erodes tinder the weight of the broad use of
mobile digital devices, any assumptions about an employee's expectation of
privacy must also be reevaluated in light of the technological changes.34
Accordingly, the ability to protect employee expectations of privacy, when
dealing with merged work and non-work communications, must address the new
realities of the mobile, digital workplace.
111. LEGAL EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY IN EMPLOYER-PROVIDED DEVICES
In addressing the new realities of the mobile digital workplace, the current
legal limitations on employee privacy protections must be explored. The overall
history on how the law has allowed employers to diminish employees'
expectations of privacy is quite expansive.35 Employees have little bargaining
32. See Herbert, supra note 2. at 50 ("Inherent in this technologically based decentralization
is the blurring of the lines between the workplace and home and between work and rest."); Marjorie
J. Peerce & Daniel V. Shapiro, The hcreasing Privacy Expectations in Emplvees' Personal Email,
J. INTERNET L., Feb. 2010. at I. I ("Mobile email devices and remote access have lengthened the
working day and further blurred the distinction between business and personal time.").
33. Steven C. Bennett, Ethics ofLawver Social Networking, 73 ALB. L. REV. 113, 115 (2009)
(citing Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845-46 (W.D. Tex. 2007)).
34. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in judgment)
("Recent years have seen the emergence of many new devices that permit [tracking].... The
availability and use of these and other new devices will continue to shape the average person's
expectations about [privacy].").
35. See, e.g., Lisa Smith-Butler, Workplace Privacy: We'll Be Watching You. 35 OHIo N.U.
L. REV. 53, 60-79 (2009) (describing the nature of employer monitoring of employees and the lack
of privacy protections); Robert Sprague, Orwell WIas an Optimist: [he Evolution of Privacv in the
United States and Its De-Evolution for American Emnplovees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 83, 111 23
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power and are subjected to the employment at will doctrine, which is essentially
a default contractual expectation for employees without definite terms of
employment that allows employees to be terminated for good reason, bad reason,
or no reason at all.36 Professor Ariana Levinson has asserted that "[s]cholars
generally agree that the law in the United States fails to adequately
protect ... employees from technological monitoring by their employers."
Furthermore, it is unlikely that employee-friendly legislation will be passed in
Congress any time in the near future. Some scholars have argued that more
state laws protecting employees' legal off-duty activities might provide some
form of protection from privacy intrusions by employers.39
(2008) (describing the lack of workplace privacy protections for employees related to email and cell
phones).
36. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 139 (4th ed. 2009); see also Nicole
B. Porter, ie Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between at-W ill Enplovnent and Just Cause,
87 NEB. L. REV. 62, 66-70 (2008) (describing the expansiveness of the at-will employment
doctrine); Michael Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class: Public Wfork and Private Lives, 66 LA. L.
REV. 1035, 1036 (2006) (noting that at-will employment relationships make resolving workplace
privacy issues difficult). This at-will employment concept is believed to have gained credence in
the United States based upon a treatise written by Horace Wood. See Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D.
Polsby, The Doubtfid Provenance of "Wood's Rule" Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 551-55
(1990) (discussing, 1-.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 134, at
271-74 (1877), and the cases relied on therein to validate the rule of at-will employment in the
United States).
37. Ariana R. Levinson, Carpe Diem: Privacy Protection in Enployment Act, 43 AKRON L.
REV. 331, 334 (2010); see also Finkin, supra note 27, at 503-04 ("The law does not perceive of
one's conduct on the job as a 'private' matter."); Jay P. Kesan, Cyber-Wlorking or Cyber-Shirking?:
A First Principles Examination ofElectronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REV. 289. 294-
304 (2002) (noting the failure of common law and statutory law in the United States to guarantee
and adequately protect electronic privacy in the workplace); S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the
Public/Private Distinction: Employee llonitoring in the Wf'orkplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825, 838 (1998)
(describing the "scholarly energy" that has been invested in exposing the lack of legal protection for
employee privacy).
38. See Kesan, supra note 37, at 304-07 (highlighting the difficulties in pursuing legislation
to address workplace privacy concerns given the United States' unique definition of privacy); see
also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) ("II circumstances involving
dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.... To date,
however, Congress and most States have not enacted statutes . . .. ) (citation omitted); Michael Z.
Green, Reading Ricci and Pyett to Provide Racial Justice Through Union Arbitration. 87 IND. L.J.
367, 370 n. 12 (2012) (describing initial efforts during President Barack Obama's administration to
enact employee-friendly legislation and the unlikely prospects that such legislation will pass any
time in the near future).
39. See, e.g., Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You Are Not at Work?:
Limiting the Use ofQOff-Duty Conduct as the Basisfor Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 680-82 (2004) (arguing that an off-duty conduct protection statute should be
enacted to protect employees from employer intrusions); Jean M. Roche, Note, Wi'hy Can't We Be
Friends?: Why California Needs a Lifestyle Discrimination Statute to Protect Enplovees fiom
Employment Actions Based on Dreir Off-Duty Behavior, 7 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 187, 198-204
(2011) (providing examples of states that have adopted statutes to protect privacy related to legal
off-duty conduct and urging California to adopt a similar statute): see also Monique Garcia, Quinn
Signs Social Netiork Passiord Law, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 2012, § 1, at 5, available at http:/airticles.
chicagotribune.com/2012-08-01 /news/chi-quinn-signs-socalled-facebook-biIl-into-law -20120801 1
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With the growth, in the past few years, of electronic mail and the
development of social and professional networking through the Internet,
colleges, employers, and litigators are frequently checking individuals' social
network pages and blogs to determine if there are items to be discovered.40
Admittedly, employers face potential liability when attempting to access
employee information classified as private.41 Nevertheless, employers have
legitimate reasons to want information about their employees, including the need
to address concerns about harassment, theft, protection of trade secrets, and
efficient performance of duties.42 Sometimes employers may need to investigate
and review an employee's ESI either as part of the employer's duties to act
responsibly tinder law or as an attempt to protect itself in litigation.
Accordingly, courts are struggling with issues relating to the use of electronic
communications and how employers have responded. 44
social-media-passwords-pat-quiim-illinois-employ ers (describing new Illinois legislation that
prohibits employers from asking employees for social media passwords to investigate an employee
or applicant's online social media profile that is password protected).
40. See Karen L. Stevenson, What's on Your Witness's MvSpace Page?, LITIG. NEWS, March
2008, at 4. 4; see also Kathrine Minotti. Note. The Advent ofDigital Diaries: inplications ofSocial
Networking Web Sites for the Legal Profession, 60 S.C. L. REV. 1057, 1057-61 (2009) (describing
how courts are increasingly issuing decisions allowing access to social network site information,
enails, and text messages as part of litigation process); Lisa Thomas, Comment, Social Networking
in the Workplace: Are Private Employers Prepared to Comply with Discovery Requests for Posts
and Tweets?, 63 SMU L. REv. 1373, 1395-1401 (2010) (discussing workplace problems that may
arise as a result of social networking use).
41. See Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH-), 2009 WL 3128420. at *2-3
(D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2) (2006)) (affirming that the employer violated
the Stored Communications Act when it repeatedly accessed a password-protected employee
discussion forum on MySpace.com); Nat'l Econ. Research Assocs. v. Evans, No. 04-2618-BLS2,
2006 WL 2440008, at *1-2, *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug,. 3, 2006) (denying plaintiffs' motion to
compel, preventing employer's access to employee communications, stored as "screen shots,"
where the employee visited the web site to send emails on a password-protected email site that the
employer discovered through the use of a computer forensics expert, and rejecting the employer's
argument of waiver because it would be difficult to have a privileged email conversation with an
attorney if "a traveling employee" would be forced to bring both a company and a personal
computer); Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 655 (N.J. 2010) ("[U]nder the
circumstances, Stengart could reasonably expect that e-mail communications with her lawyer
through her personal account would remain private, and that sending and receiving them via a
company laptop did not eliminate the attorney-client privilege that protected them.").
42. Selmi, supra note 36, at 1042-43, see also Doe v. XYC Corp., 887 A.2d 1156, 1160-67
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (discussing a third party lawsuit in which the parties were seeking
to establish employer liability because the employer established its right to monitor electronic
communications made by employees and one of those employees used the employer's computer to
access child pornography and send pictures of one of the plaintiffs children to child pornography
web sites). But see Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538. 552 (N.J. 2000) (finding that
an employer does not have a duty to monitor an employee's private electronic communications).
43. See Peerce & Shapiro, supra note 32, at 1, 14 (discussing potential liability coincident
with the "legal need to review" an employee's material on company computers when involved in
"an internal investigation, employment dispute, or civil litigation").
44. See Karen L. Stevenson, Courts Confiont Admissibility of Text and hIstant Mfessages,
LITIG. NEWS, Mar. 2008. at 4, 4 5.
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The implementation of an Internet or device-usage policy provides an
opportunity for employers to defend against workplace privacy claims more
directly. Often, pointing to the language of the Internet or device-usage policy
serves as validation for the employer's actions and refutes any other related
claims.45  However, employees may look to the law as developed under the
Fourth Amendment, common law, and statutory law to understand whatever
limited privacy protections may exist when the issue involves communications
stored on employer-provided devices.4 6
A. Fourth Amendment Employee Privacy Protections: Ortega and Quon
Although a governmental employer's accessing an employee's EST raises
issues of constitutional rights that do not apply directly in the private sector,
cases involving public employees may be helpful in understanding workplace
matters in the private sector. Specifically, the Court's interpretation of privacy
issues involving employees inder the Fourth Amendment 47 has implications for
other areas of privacy law. 8  The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the
45. See, e.g., Najee-Ullah v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 05CV6202(GBD), at *1 n.2, *4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008) (dismissing plaintiffs claims for violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and New York Labor Law because the "defendant ... provided a legitimate non-retaliatory
reason for the alleged adverse employment actions" a violation of the employer's Internet policy);
Rizzo v. PPL Serv. Corp., Nos. 03-5779, 03-5780. 03-5781. 2005 WL 913091, at *10, *11 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 19, 2005) (rejecting claims based on age discrimination wvhile noting that the company's
dismissal was founded on violations of email policy rather than discrimination).
46. Privacy law consists of much more than tort law. See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years
of Privacy, 1992 WIs. L. REV. 1335, 1434 (providing support for the claim that privacy law cannot
be easily defined because it consists of five "species" or interrelated areas: (1) torts (2) the Fourth
Amendment; (3) the First Amendment; (4) the Fourteenth Amendment, and (5) state constitutional
law). Further, there are state and federal statutes that address privacy implications as well. See,
e.g., Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2006) (providing privacy for
electronically stored information); Roche, supra note 39, at 198-202 (providing examples of states
that have adopted statutes to protect privacy in legal off-duty activity, termed "lifestyle
discrimination"): Garcia, supra note 39. at 5 (describing recent Illinois legislation dealing with
privacy law protection from employer efforts to obtain social network passwords).
47. See generally Dieter C. Damineier, Fading Privacy Rights of Public Employees, 6 HARV.
L. & POLY REV. 297, 297 (2012) (describing the erosion of privacy rights of public sector
employees under the Fourth Amendment); Paul M. Secunda, Privatizing Workplace Privacy, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (describing Fourth Amendment privacy concerns and
proposing stronger public sector employee protection from Fourth Amendment privacy intrusions
by employers by requiring probable cause to obtain a warrant before conducting any form of
investigator ' workplace search).
48. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Stanley in Cyberspace: 47 the Privacy Protection of the First
.4mendment Should Be fore Like that of the Fourth, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 357, 373 (2010) (citing City
of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010)) (admiring the Court's analysis of Fourth
Amendment privacy concerns in Quon as encompassing a broad acknowledgement of an
employee's right to privacy in their own cell phones and Internet accounts and suggesting expansion
of that doctrine to First Amendment jurisprudence).
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Fourth Amendment's privacy protection for public employees in its 1987
decision, O'Connor v. Ortega.
In Ortega, a plurality composed of Justices O'Connor, White, Powell, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist found that a two-step inquiry applied to determine
whether a public employee had a Fourth Amendment protection based upon a
reasonable expectation of privacy in items stored in his workplace desk: (1) a
court must consider the "operational realities of the workplace" to assess
whether the employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his workplace
items; and (2) if the employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
workplace items, then the focus shifts to whether the "public employer intrusions
on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-
related misconduct," were "reasonable[] under all the circumstances." 0 On the
other hand, in an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia rejected the
operational realities component of the plurality decision and argued that, as a
general principle, public employees have an expectation of privacy in their
employer-provided desks; however, "government searches [of those desks] to
retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules"
are reasonable intrusions that "do not violate the Fourth Amendment."_51
More recently, the issue of privacy expectations in the workplace-under the
Fourth Amendment-arose in City of Ontario v. Quon.52 In Quon. a police
officer's employer-provided pager was searched to review text messages. The
City of Ontario, California Police Department (OPD) issued pagers to its police
officers to improve communications and provide more efficient responses by the
police force. The service provider for the pagers was Arch Wireless Operating
Company, who, for a set monthly fee, provided a limited number of text
characters that could be sent and received each month on each pager.
Messages in excess of the character limit would result in additional charges to be
paid by the officers to prevent the OPD from having to audit the texts each
month to determine if the overage was due to personal text messages. 6 When
the OPD first issued the pagers to the police force, the officers were told that text
messages on the pagers would be treated like emails and were therefore subject
to the OPD's "Computer Usage, Internet and E-mail Policy" (Computer Use
Policy). 57 The Computer Use Policy stated that the OPD "reserves the right to
monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or
49. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
50. Id at 711-12, 717, 725-26.
51. Id at 730, 732 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
52. 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
53. Id. at 2624.
54. Id at 2625.
55. Id
56. Id.
57. Id.
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without notice," and that "[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or
confidentiality when using these resources."
Shortly after the pagers were issued, Quon began to regularly acquire
overage charges for which he paid the OPD. 9 After some time, the lieutenant in
charge of the OPD's contract with Arch Wireless told his Chief that he was
"tired of being a bill collector" for the overages.60 As a result, the Chief decided
that the OPD should determine if the character limit on the text messages was
too low for the police officers or if the excessive charges were due to personal
61
messages. The OPD requested two months of text transcripts from Arch
Wireless, which indicated that "many of the messages sent and received on
Quon's pager were not work-related, and some were sexually explicit."62 The
matter was handed over to OPD's internal affairs department, and the officer in
charge of the internal review first pulled out all of the messages that were sent
from Quon's pager during his non-working hours so the review could focus on
only those messages sent or received while Quon was working.63  The
investigator determined that during one month of transcripts only fifty-seven of
the 456 messages sent and received were work-related.64 As a result, Quon was
65disciplined .
Quon challenged the OPD's disciplinary action in federal court and argued,
among other things, that the OPD violated Quon's rights under the Fourth
Amendment by searching through his messages on his employer-provided
pager.66 The United States District Court for the Central District of California
determined that the OPD's audit of Quon's text messages was reasonable.67
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in
part, agreeing with the district court that Quon had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his text messages but determining that the search, though legitimately
work-related, was unreasonable in scope.68 The court of appeals determined that
the OPD could have found a less intrusive way to meet the business needs of the
department.69
58. Id. (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 152a, City of Ontario v. Quon,
130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (No. 08-1332), 2009 WL 1155423, at *4).
59. Id at 2625-26.
60. Id. at 2626 (quoting Joint Appendix at 91, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619
(2010) (No. 08-1332), 2010 WL 546073, at *91).
61. Id
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id
65. Id
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2626 27 (citing Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1146
(C.D. Cal. 2006), affd in part. rev d in part, 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008). rev'd and remanded sub
nom., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010)).
68. Id. at 2627 (citing Quon, 529 F.3d at 908).
69. Id. (citing Quon, 529 F.3d at 909).
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While resolving the privacy issues on other grounds,70 the Supreme Court in
Quon expressed concern about delineating the scope of privacy expectations in
digital devices provided by employers:
Before turning to the reasonableness of the search, it is instructive to
note the parties' disagreement over whether Quon had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The record does establish that OPD, at the
outset, made it clear that pager messages were not considered private.
The City's Computer [Use] Policy stated that "[u]sers should have no
expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using" City
computers.... The Court must proceed with care when considering the
whole concept of privacy expectations in communications made on
electronic equipment owned by a government employer. The judiciary
risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment
implications of emerging technology before its role in society has
become clear.. It is not so clear that courts at present are on so sure a
ground. Prudence counsels caution before the facts in the instant case
are used to establish far-reaching premises that define the existence, and
extent, of privacy expectations enjoyed by employees when using
employer-provided communication devices.
Despite Justice Scalia's objections, the Court in Quon did offer some
powerful statements about an employee's reasonable expectation of privacy in
employer-provided equipment when Justice Kennedy, in dicta, noted:
Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information
transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in what
society accepts as proper behavior. As one anici brief notes, many
employers expect or at least tolerate personal use of such equipment by
employees because it often increases worker efficiency. Another
anicus points out that the law is beginning to respond to these
developments, as some States have recently passed statutes requiring
employers to notify employees when monitoring their electronic
communications. At present, it is uncertain how workplace norms, and
the law's treatment of them, will evolve.... Cell phone and text
message communications are so pervasive that some persons may
consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-
70. See id. at 2629 33 (deciding that, even if Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy,
the search was reasonable because it was not excessive in scope and was motivated by a legitimate
work-related purpose).
71. Id. at 2629 (second alteration in original) (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 58, at 152a, 2009 WL 1155423, at *4).
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expression, even self-identification. That might strengthen the case for
an expectation of privacy.72
Accordingly, Justice Kennedy's comments in Quon provide a key framework to
make the case that employees do have reasonable expectations of privacy in
employer-provided devices.
However, Justice Kennedy also acknowledged the dilemma the Court faced
in Quon when he suggested that employees may have legitimate alternatives to
make their communications without using employer-provided devices and that
employer policies do play some role in the reasonableness of an employee's
expectations:
On the other hand, the ubiquity of those devices has made them
generally affordable, so one could counter that employees who need cell
phones or similar devices for personal matters can purchase and pay for
their own. And employer policies concerning communications will of
course shape the reasonable expectations of their employees, especially
to the extent that such policies are clearly communicated. A broad
holding concerning employees' privacy expectations vis-a-vis
employer-provided technological equipment might have implications for
future cases that cannot be predicted. It is preferable to dispose of this
case on narrower grounds.
In evading the expectation of privacy question and moving to the
reasonableness of the employer's intrusions, the Court in Quon decided that the
scope of the OPD's search was appropriate because it was an efficient way to
determine if the overages were due to work-related messages.74 The scope was
reasonable in that the OPD looked only at two months of text messages-and
eliminated all messages sent during Quon's off-duty time-rather than searching
the entire period the pagers were in use.75 Furthermore. Quon was told that the
pagers were subject to auditing, and as a member of the police force, he should
have suspected the OPD might have an occasional operational need to look at the
text messages in an emergency situation."6 The Court clarified that, just because
72. Id at 2629 30 (citations omitted).
73. Id at 2630. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, criticized the Court's "[t]he-tines-
they-are-a-changin" refusal to address the expectation-of-privacy analysis as being a "feeble excuse
for disregard of duty." Id at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Even
more, Justice Scalia expressed his indignation about the Court's assertion that it was "agnostic"
about the expectation-of-privacy analysis while at the same time offering "a heavy-handed hint,"
which will result in "bombarding lower courts with arguments about employer policies, how they
were communicated, and whether they were authorized, as well as the latest trends in employees'
use of electronic media." Id.
74. Id at 2631 (majority opinion).
75. Id
76. Id
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"OPD could have performed [a] search that would have been less intrusive, it
does not follow that the search as conducted was unreasonable."77
Although the OPD had a Computer Use Policy in place providing that
"[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using"
the Internet or sending emails on OPD-owned computers and prohibiting
"inappropriate, derogatory, obscene, suggestive, defamatory, or harassing
language in the e-mail system," 8 the policy made no explicit reference to
pagers. Nevertheless, most employers believe they can safely institute such
policies, impose them on employees as a condition of employment, and protect
themselves from privacy challenges by asserting that the policies remove or
lower any expectation of privacy. These policies also operate as a form of
consent to search the employer-provided electronic equipment by getting the
employee to agree ahead of time that the employer owns the equipment and any
information on it.81 The argument is that "[c]onsent negates liability provided
that the invasion does not exceed the scope of the consent."8 2  In contrast,
77. Id. at 2632.
78. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd and
remanded sub nom., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010)).
79. Ouon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625.
80. See Steven C. Bennett. Civil Discovery of Social Networking Infornation, 39 Sw. U. L.
REV. 413, 424 (2010); Amanda . Lavis, Note, Enployers Cannot Get the Message: Text Messaging
and Employee Privacy, 54 VILL. L. REV. 513, 533 (2009) (suggesting a general understanding that
an employee has no expectation of privacy if the employer's policy explicitly states that the
information is owvned by the employer and is not for personal use); see also Herbert, supra note 2, at
67-70 (describing cases where employers' Internet policies have been found to establish that the
employee did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy); Cicero H. Brabham, Jr., Note,
Curiouser and Curiouser: Are Emplovers the Mfodern Day Alice in Wlonderland? Closing the
Ambiguity in Federal Privacy Law as Employers Cyher-Snoop Beyond the Workplace, 62 RUTGERS
L. REV. 993. 1015 n.172 (2010) (describing jurisdictions that have held that employees have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in their work computers); Tra David, Note, Privacy Concerns
Regarding the Monitoring of Instant Messaging in the Workplace: Is It Big Brother or Just
Business?, 5 NEV. L.J. 319, 343 (2004) (asserting that an employee's knowledge of the employer's
ability to capture and store email may warrant consent and authorization to look at the emails while
removing concerns about privacy).
81. See Brabham, supra note 80, at 995, 996-1014 (describing how courts have implied
consent to intrusions and searches from employee knowledge that employers can monitor the
information and analyzing whether "the current, broad interpretation of 'consent,' which enables
employers to monitor internal electronic communications under the Wiretap Act, should equally
apply to 'authorization' in cases involving external electronic storage brought under the Storage
Act"); see also Bennett, supra note 80, at 424 n.67 (collecting cases finding employee had no
reasonable expectation of privacy). But see Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp,
587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding employer's policy failed to establish consent
even where the employee's login information to a private email account was stored on the
employer's computer).
82. Andrew F. Caplan & Robert J. Donovan. The Ethical Investigation of Fidelity Claims
Protecting Privacy, 10 FIDELITY L.J. 63. 83-84 (2004) (citing Tracy B. Holton, Cause of Action to
Recover Damages for Invasion ofPrivate Sector Employee's Privacy, 18 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 87
§ 3-6 (2003), superseded by article, Richard E. Kaye, Cause of 4ction to Recover Damages for
Invasion of Private Sector Employees' Privacy by Intrusion upon Seclusion, 42 CAUSES OF ACTION
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Europe's data protection scheme does "not condition protection on an
expectation of privacy" and protects even data that is publicly available. 8  This
Article asserts that the Court should eventually find that employees, whether
public employees covered by the Fourth Amendment or private employees
covered by federal, local, and common law privacy protections, do have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic information stored on employer-
provided mobile devices and that the expectation cannot be waived through
employer policies imposed as a condition of employment.84
B. Tort-Based Employee Privacy Expectations
Employees in the private sector often look to the "Intrusion Upon Seclusion"
section of the Restatement (Second) of Torts85 as a remedy against employer
invasion of privacy. 86  This privacy tort developed from the common law.87
However, the concept of privacy rights probably originated in Judge Thomas
Cooley's 1880 treatise expressing the power of the "right to be let alone."88
2d 255 § 6 (2009)); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 74 SW.3d 634, 648-49 (Ark. 2002)
(asserting that signed consent to search was coercive and achieved through duress wlhich made it
reasonable for a j ury to consider the consent invalid w hen looking at the employer's invasion of the
employees privacy).
83. See Lothar Determann & Robert Sprague, Intrusive Monitoring: Employee Privacy
Expectations Are Reasonable in Europe, Destroyed in the United States, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
979, 1025 (2011).
84. But see Leading Cases, 124 IARv. L. REV. 179, 179 80 (2010) (asserting that "[t]he
Court [in Quoin] should have ruled that public employees do not enjoy a reasonable expectation of
privacy when sending text messages from government-issued devices").
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
86. See Leonard Court & Courtney Warmington, The Workplace Privacy Myth: Why
Electronic Mlonitoring Is Here to Stay, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 15, 33 (2004).
87. Many have traced the development of this legal protection from invasion of privacy to the
landmark article, Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 IARv. L. REV.
193 (1890). Dean William Prosser agreed that the Warren and Brandeis article played a significant
role in the development of privacy protection under the common law. See William L. Prosser.
Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 383-89 (1960) (describing the impact of the Warren and Brandeis
article). In the employment setting, the American Law Institute (ALI) recently approved a privacy
section of its ongoing project, a Restatement of Employment Law, which may become a source for
addressing workplace privacy protections. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP'T LAW: EMP.
PRIVACY AND AUTONOMY § 7.01, (Tentative Draft No. 5, (2012), available at http://www.ali.org/
00021333/Employment LawTD5_online.pdf. The ALI Council approved Chapter 7 of this
Restatement in January 2012, subject to discussion and final editing. Restatement Third,
Employment Law, ALI PUBLICATIONS CATALOG, http://wvw.ali.org/index.cfin?fuseaction=
publications.ppage&node id=31 (last visited Dec. 27, 2012). Chapter 7 was approved by the ALI
membership on May 22, 2012 at its annual meeting. See Updates, ALI 2012 ANN. MEETING,
http://2012am.ali.org/updates.cfin?startrow=31 (last visited Dec. 27, 2012).
88. See Stall v. State, 570 So.2d 257, 265 (Fla. 1990) (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, A
'TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29
(1st ed. 1880)).
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Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis expanded that concept in their landmark
1890 law review article, "The Right to Privacy." 89
The next major expansion of this tort occurred when Dean William Prosser
addressed it in his landmark 1960 law review article, Privacy. 90 According to
Dean Prosser, "[w]hat has emerged from the [common law] decisions is . . . not
one [invasion of privacy] tort, but a complex of four." I Those four types of
invasion of privacy torts are: (1) "Intrusion upon a [person's] seclusion or
solitude, or into [the person's] private affairs"; (2) "Public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts about the [person]"; (3) "Publicity which places the
[person] in a false light in the public eye"; and (4) "Appropriation" by a person,
for that person's advantage, of the "name or likeness" of another person. Dean
Prosser's analysis of the invasion of privacy tort was incorporated into the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which identifies these four different types of
invasion of privacy torts in their shortened form as: "Intrusion upon
Seclusion"; 93 "Appropriation of Name or Likeness"; 94 "Publicity Given to
Private Life";95 and "Publicity Placing Person in False Light."96
A classic example and application of the invasion of privacy tort in the
employment setting occurred in Smyth v. Pillsbwy Co.97 Therein, an employee
who sent an email to his supervisor criticizing his employer was terminated
despite being told that his communications would be kept private.98 The court,
while considering various legal concerns, looked at the invasion of privacy tort
pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652B, which establishes a
claim for invasion of privacy based upon unreasonable intrusion upon the
seclusion of an individual.99 Under that section of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, liability for invasion of privacy can occur when there is an unreasonable
intrusion that is substantial and would be offensive to a reasonable person. 10o
However, after applying the section 652 provisions for invasion of privacy based
upon unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion, the court in Smyth concluded
that there is no "reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail
communications ... notwithstanding any assurances that such communications
would not be intercepted by management." 101
89. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 87.
90. See Prosser, supra note 87, at 389-410.
91. Id at 389.
92. Id
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
94. Id § 652C.
95. Id § 652D.
96. Id. 652E.
97. 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
98. Id at 98-99 & n.1.
99. Id at 100-01.
100. Id at 100 (citing Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir. 1992)).
101. Id at 101.
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Specifically, the court noted that when "communications [were] voluntarily
made by an employee to his supervisor over the company e-mail
system ... apparently utilized by the entire company, any reasonable expectation
of privacy was lost." 02 Then, the court found that even if there was a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the employer's interception of the employee's email
communications could not invade the employee's privacy interests because they
could not be considered "a substantial and highly offensive invasion of his
privacy." 1o According to the court in Smyth, the employer had a legitimate,
work-related interest in "preventing inappropriate and unprofessional comments
or even illegal activity over its e-mail system [that] outweighs any privacy
interest the employee may have in those comments." 104 One commentator has
asserted that the 1996 holding in Smyth was extremely important in limiting the
ability of employees to pursue tort-based invasion of privacy claims because the
decision made it "more difficult to argue . . . that such an expectation [of privacy
in workplace email communications] is reasonable."105 Nevertheless, because
"most American employees believe that their e-mails are private," 106 the law
should expand to recognize this belief.
Unfortunately, other cases addressing invasion of privacy under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts still suggest that courts may not be willing to
expand the expectation of privacy in employee emails through tort law. In an
unpublished opinion, McLaren v. Mficrosoft Corp.,107 the employee asked the
court to determine, pursuant to Texas law, that an "employer's review and
dissemination of [an employee's email] stored in a 'personal folders' application
on [the employee's] office computer" involved an invasion of privacy tort for
intruding upon his seclusion.108 In an unpublished opinion, the court rejected
McLaren's tort claim.109  McLaren was suspended pending an investigation
regarding accusations of sexual harassment made against him. 110  While the
investigation was pending, McLaren requested access to his office computer to
102. Id
103. Id
104. Id
105. See Peter J. Isajiw, Comment, Workplace E-mail Privacy Concerns: Balancing the
Personal Dignity of Employees with the Proprietary hterests of Efmloyers, 20 TEMP. ENvTL. L. &
'TECH. J. 73, 75 (2001) (citing Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101).
106. Id at 79-80: see also Paul E. Hash & Christina M. Ibrahim, E-mail, Electronic
Monitoring, and Employee Privacy, 37 S. TEX. L. REv. 893, 894 & n.5 (1996) (noting that the
controversy over employer access to private email files "stems from the diametrically opposite
views held by employers and employees regarding the ownership of E-mail" because "[e]mployees
consider their E-mail messages to be their private property") (quoting Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, An
Affront to Human Dignity: Electronic fail Mfonitoring in the Private Sector Wlorkplace, 8 HARV.
J.L & TECH. 345, 349 (1995)).
107. No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 WL 339015 (Tex. Ct. App. May 28, 1999).
108. Id at * 1.
109. Id
110. Id at *5.
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disprove the allegations and asked that "no one tamper with his [office
computer]."
After his termination, McLaren filed an invasion of privacy suit against his
employer for "breaking into" his work computer to review files stored in a
"personal" folder and then disseminating the information in those files to third
parties. McLaren had restricted access to the folder by creating and using a
personal password.'" McLaren's employer, Microsoft, argued: "[t]he common
law of Texas does not recognize any right of privacy in the contents of electronic
mail systems and storage that are provided to employees by the employer as part
of the employment relationship."I 4
The trial court in AIcLaren agreed with the employer and, on appeal, the
appellate court explained that Texas does recognize four kinds of torts for
invasion of privacy: "(1) [i]ntrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude into
his private affairs; (2) [p]ublic disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff; (3) [p]ublicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye; [and] (4) [a]Fpropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs
name or likeness." 6 The court also found that because the employer provided
the computer to the employee for the purpose of storing work-related items, not
personal items, these emails were not the employee's "personal property." '
Also, even though the employee moved and saved his emails to a private folder
which was password-protected, the fact that emails traveled over the company's
network and were accessible by the employer at some point suggested there had
been no reasonable expectation of privacy. Further, even if the employee had
such an expectation, the court found that Microsoft's interception of the
communications was not a highly offensive invasion because of the compan 's
interest in preventing illegal and unprofessional activity over its email system.
111. Id at *1.
112. Id
113. I .
114. Id (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Id at *2.
116. Id at *3 (citing Indus. Found. of the S. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 682
(Tex. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977)); see also Brabham, supra note 80, at 1015 n. 176
(asserting that three of the invasion of privacy torts apply to employee monitoring: "(1) the
unreasonable intrusion into the 'private affairs or concerns' of another"; "(2) the unreasonable
disclosure of 'matter concerning the private life of another'"; and "(3) 'publicity [that unreasonably
places another] in a false light'" (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 652B, D, & E
(1977))).
117. MlcLaren, 1999 WL 339015, at *4.
118. Id
119. Id at *5.
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C. Stored Communications Act
The Stored Communications Act (SCA)120 establishes criminal and civil
liability for someone who "intentionally accesses without authorization a facility
through which an electronic communication service is provided" or
"intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility" when the action
involves "access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic
storage in such system." The SCA provides a major vehicle for employer
liability when an employer accesses ESI.122 In one key case, an employee, who
sued her employer for sexual harassment, discovered during litigation that her
supervisor retrieved emails from her personal email account through an
employer-provided computer.123 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found no
error in the district court's punitive damages award for her claim that the
supervisor's actions violated the SCA. 1
In another case, an employer attempted to circumvent the SCA by asking
two employees, who had access to another employee's created web site, to
provide the employer their passwords so that the employer would have
authorized access to the password-protected web site.' Other employers have
sought to obtain or have required that employees provide passwords to social
media web sites.126 But, some states have responded negatively to these acts by
120. 18 U.S.C. § 2701-2711 (2006).
121. Id. § 2701. For a more detailed discussion of the SCA, see Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide
to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1208 (2004) (providing a comprehensive review of the SCA).
122. See, e.g., Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548,
552 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (describing SCA claim where an employer accessed a former employee's
Hotmail account and used a password sent to that account to discover and access the former
employee's Gmail account as well). The employee was able to prevail in the SCA claim based
upon the employer's access of the two email accounts. See Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc. v. Warrior
Fitness Boot Camp, LLC, 759 F. Supp. 2d 417. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
123. Van Alstyne v. Electronic Scriptorium, Ltd., 560 F.3d 199. 202 (4th Cir. 2009): see also
Searcey, supra note 26, at AI7 (describing how, in the Van Alstvne case, a supervisor obtained
access to an employee's private AOL email account, which she sometimes used for business
purposes on her employer-provided computer, and the supervisor continued to read her personal
email account even after the employee stopped working for the employer).
124. Man 41stvne, 560 F.3d at 209. The case, however, was remanded to the district court to
reevaluate the merits in light of the court's ruling that proof of actual damages must be present for
Van Alstyne to recover statutory damages. Id.
125. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 872 73 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the SCA claim, reasoning that
"we must assume that neither [employee] was a 'user' of the website at the time he authorized [the
employer] to view it." Id. at 880.
126. See, e.g., Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754(FSH-), 2009 WL 3128420 at *3.
*6 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009) (rejecting employer's argument that an employee gave verbal consent to
allow the employer to access a password-protected online chat forum. suggesting that the jury could
have believed that the employee did not authorize the access and was instead improperly coerced to
give up the password, and upholding a jury verdict along with punitive damages for an SCA
violation).
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making it illegal for employers to demand passwords to electronic sites from
employees or applicants. 12
In the intermediate appellate court decision that led to the Supreme Court's
decision in Quon, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found
a violation of the SCA.128 In a part of the decision that was not challenged to the
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit held that Arch Wireless violated the SCA
when it knowingly turned over pager text transcripts to the City of Ontario
Police Department, which was not an intended recipient or an addressee of the
129
messages.
D. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)130 appears to create criminal
liability for an employer who attempts to gain unauthorized access to an
employee's personal electronic device and provides for civil liability as well
when the unauthorized access causes damages exceeding $5,000. 131 The law
was originally designed to respond to juvenile hackers by prohibiting them from
attacking the federal government's computers.1 However, the CFAA has also
been used to deter industrial espionage efforts related to the hacking of a
business computer to obtain trade secrets. 13 In a recent case, Chief Judge
Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit asked
whether the CFAA also extends to situations where employees exceed the
limitations created by employer electronic use policies: "Many employers have
adopted policies prohibiting the use of work computers for nonbusiness
purposes. Does an employee who violates such a policy commit a federal crime?
How about someone who violates the terms of service of a social networking
website? This depends on how broadly we read the [CFAA]." 134 However, the
127. See Garcia, supra note 39, at 5 (Illinois); Kevin Rector, Mfayland Becomes First State to
Ban Enployers from Asking for Social Media Passwords. BALT. SUN (Apr. 10, 2012, 10:15 PM).
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-04-10/news/bs-nd-privacy -law-20120410_1_facebook-pass
word-social-media-bradley-shear (Maryland).
128. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 903 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied on
SCA issue sub nom.. USA Mobility Wireless v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009) (mem.), andrev'd on
other grounds sub nom., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
129. Id. at 900. 903.
130. 18 U.S.C.§ 1030 (2006).
13 1. Id. See generally Andrew T. Hernacki, Comment, A Vague Law in a Snartphone World:
Limiting the Scope of UnauthorizedAccess Under the Computer FraudandAbuse Act, 61 Am.U. L.
REV. 1543, 1551-74 (2012) (citations omitted).
132. Hernacki, supra note 131. at 1546 (citing Sarah Boyer, Note, Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act: Abusing Federal Jurisdiction?, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 661, 665 (2009)).
133. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856-63 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted)
(discussing the extent and possible interpretations of the CFAA). In Naosal, employees of a
company violated their company's use policy and transferred confidential records to a third party.
Id. at 856. The Ninth Circuit found that the CFAA does not apply to internal violations of a
company's policies. Id. at 863.
134. Id. at 856.
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Ninth Circuit refused to extend the CFAA-which covers hacking into a
computer to obtain unauthorized access to data-to acts involving employee
misuse of authorized access to data. 1 While employer-provided devices do not
seem to pose a problem of unauthorized access under the CFAA, employers who
allow employees to use their personal devices and later attempt to access those
devices without, or beyond the scope of, the employee's permission may face
CFAA concerns.
IV. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: A NEW INDICATOR OF PRIVACY
EXPECTATIONS
On September 13, 2009, a New York Times article identified that there are
"thousands of blogs and so many lawyers online," and the "collisions between
the freewheeling ways of the Internet and the tight boundaries of legal discourse
are inevitable-whether they result in damaged careers or simply raise
eyebrows." 1 37 A recent study indicated that "86 percent of lawyers ages 25 to 35
are members of social networks like Facebook, Linkedin and MySpace."1 8 The
article also provided a number of recent examples regarding the ethical problems
that lawyers have faced when dealing with cyberspace communications. 139 One
example was a situation where an attorney who made hostile comments on a
blog about a judge he had appeared in front of received sanctions and an ethical
reprimand for such communications.140
All of these cyberspace collisions with attorney ethics issues may also
provide a window into the realities of employee privacy expectations when
dealing with the significant technological growth in electronic communications
through the development of various digital devices. Joining concepts of
employee privacy and ethics is not new. In 1993, Frank Cavico identified a
merger of these issues with respect to the ethics of secretly monitoring
135. Id. at 857. 863 (refusing to "transform the CFAA from an anti-hacking statute into an
expansive misappropriation statute").
136. See GARRY G. MATHIASON ET AL., THE "BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE" TO WORK
MOVENWNT: ENGINEERING PRACTIcAL EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS
13-16 (2012), available at http://wwwlittler.con/files/press/pdfTlieLittlerReport-TheBringYour
OwnDeviceToWorkMovement.pdf (describing CFAA concerns for employers when employees are
allowed to use their personal electronic devices at work).
137. John Schwartz, A Legal Battle: Online Attitude IVs. Rules of the Bar, N.Y. TIES (late
ed.), Sept. 13, 2009, at 1.
138. Id. (citing LEADER NETWORKS, 2009 NETWORKS FOR COUNSEL STUDY: A GLOBAL
STUDY OF Tm LEGAL INDUSTRY'S ADOPTION OF ONLINE PROFESSIONAL NETWORKING,
PREFERENCES, USAGE AND FUTUTRE PREDICTIONS 10 (2009), available at http://www.1eademetworks.
com/docunents/Networks for Counsel_2009.pdf).
139. Id.
140. Id.: see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Too luch Inforination: Blogging Lawyers Face
Ethical and Legal Problens, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 14, 2009, 9:52 AM), http://www.abajournal.cominews
/article/too much information blogging_1awyers face ethical and legalproblems (describing a
reprimand for ain attorney who described a judge as an "evil, unfair witch" in a blog post).
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employees.141 More recently, in 2010, Gregory Sisk and Nicholas Halbur
suggested that employee privacy issues in the workplace may also raise concerns
regarding attorney-client-privilege ethics.142 Specifically, concerns about
privacy and confidentiality of communications made by employees to their
attorneys on employer-provided equipment have resulted in ethical challenges
based upon violations of attorney-client privilege. 14 These ethical challenges,
and the actions of the employers and employees involved, help to identify the
parameters of employee expectations of privacy and confidentiality. 144
The ABA Model Rules for attorney ethics were amended in 2002 to include
Model Rule 4.4(b), which provides "that a receiving lawyer who 'knows or
reasonably should know that [a] document was inadvertently sent shall promptly
notify the sender.", 14 5 A comment to this Model Rule provides that "[w]hether
the [receiving] lawyer is required to take additional steps, such as returning the
document or electronically stored information, is a matter of law beyond the
141. See Frank J. Cavico. invasion ofPrivacy in the Private Employment Sector: Tortious and
Ethical Aspects, 30 -OUS. L. REV. 1263, 1265-67 (1993) (asserting that there is ain "immense new
array of sophisticated technology . . . available to the employer ... to engage in surveillance,
monitoring, and testing of employees" that makes secret supervision possible). For a modern
discussion of using social media and digital technology as a form of surveillance of employees and
the attomey ethical implications, see Allison Clemency, Comment, "Friending, " "Folloivng, " and
"Digging" up Evidentiary Dirt: The Ethical Implications of Investigating Information on Social
ledia Wiebsites. 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1021. 1029-35 (2011) (describing ethical committee decisions
regarding an attomey's access of social media).
142. See Gregory C. Sisk & Nicholas Halbur, A Ticking Tine Bomb? University Data Privacy
Policies and Attorney Client Confidentiality in Law School Settings, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 1277.
1278; see also Richard L. Marcus, The Electronic Lawyer, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 263, 293-98 (2009)
(describing how the expanded use of email, laptops, and other handheld computer devices has
resulted in problems maintaining attomey client confidences).
143. See Sisk & Halbur, supra note 142, at 1278.
144. See Kara R. Williams. Note. Protecting What lou Thought Was Yours: Expanding
Employee Privacy to Protect the Attorney-Client Privilegefrom Employer Computer Monitoring, 69
OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 367-81 (2008); see also John Gergacz, Employees' Use of Employer Computers
to Communicate with Their Own Attorneys and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 10 COMiPUTER L.
REV. & TECH. J. 269, 286 (2006) ("Employees' privilege assertions are most at risk if their
communications violated company computer-use policy, the employee[] understood that [she was]
doing so, and the policy contained a monitoring provision."); Hill, supra note 8, at 572-82
(describing privacy expectations and attorney-client-privilege cases); Meir S. Hornung, Note, Think
Before You Type: A Look at Email Privacy in the Vorkplace, II FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 115,
128 (2005) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977)); Adam C. Losey, Note,
Clicking away Confidentiality Workplace Waiver ofAttorney-Client Privilege, 60 FLA. L. REV.
1179, 1184 (2008) (suggesting that courts should adopt a rebuttable presumption of waiver of
attomey client privilege to establish "predictability in workplace waiver cases"); Searcey, supra
note 26, at A17 (describing cases related to privacy challenges resulting from employer decisions to
retrieve employee information from an employer-provided device).
145. Schaefer, supra note II, at 205 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 4.4(b)
(2011)). This Model Rule was amended at the ABA House of Delegates Annual Meeting in August
2012 to add "electronically stored information" to the inadvertently sent inquiry. See ABA
COMMI'N ON ETHICS 20/20. REVISED RESOLUTION 105A, at 5 (2012) [hereinafter 20/20
RESOLUTION], available at http://www.americanibar.oig/content/dam/iabaadministrative/ethics_2020/201
20808 revised resolution_1 05Ias amended.authcheckdam.pdf.
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scope of these Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of a
document or electronically stored information has been waived."1 46 Another
comment to Rule 4.4 notes that a lawyer may return inadvertently disclosed
information unread, even if the attorney has no legal obligation to do so.
One commentator recently noted the implications for attorneys in dealing
with inadvertent disclosures under Model Rule 4.4:
Thirty-two states have adopted Model Rule 4.4(b) or a substantially
similar provision. Eight states and the District of Columbia have
adopted their own professional conduct rules that require receiving
counsel to take one or more steps beyond notification. In thirty-nine of
these forty-one jurisdictions with a professional conduct rule addressing
the issue, the receiving attorney has no obligation unless he or she
determines opposing counsel sent the document "inadvertently." In the
remaining ten states, no professional conduct rule addresses the
recipient's ethical obligations. Regardless of whether a state has or has
not adopted an inadvertent disclosure rule, recipients of inadvertent
disclosure should research the jurisdiction's ethics opinions and case
law that may provide additional authority, conflicting authority, or the
only authority regarding counsel's obligations. Finally, attorneys should
proceed with caution when practicing in a jurisdiction that has not
definitively addressed the issue, as their case may be the one in which
the jurisdiction announces its expectations for counsel.
Model Rule 4.4(b) does not clearly prohibit use of an inadvertent
-149communication prior to a waiver ruling. However, some jurisdictions have
expanded their ethical requirements to find that the attorney must either refrain
from reviewing such materials or review them only to the extent required to
determine how to proceed appropriately.Iso Upon completing that review, the
attorney should notify the adversary's lawyer that such materials are in the
possession of the attorney and should either follow instructions of the
adversary's lawyer with respect to the disposition of the materials or refrain from
using the materials until a definitive resolution as to the proper disposition of the
materials is obtained from a court. A few recent cases, along with recent state
146. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cnt. 2 (2012), available at http://www.amer
icanibar.org/groups/professional responsibility/publications/model rules-of professionalconduct/rule_4
4 respect for rights of thirdpersons/comment on rule_4_4.htnl.
147. Id. R. 4.4 cnt. 3; Schaefer, supra note 11, at 205.
148. Schaefer, supra note 11, at 206-08 (footnotes omitted).
149. Id. at 225.
150. See, e.g., Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. No. 99-01 (1999), available at
http://www.utahbar.org/rules ops_pols/ethics opinions/op_99 01.html (discussing ABA ethics
advisory opinions).
151. Id. ("[T]he best course of action [is] for the receiving attorney to advise opposing
counsel ... and then either return the documents or seek assistance from the court in determining
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and ABA ethics opinions, highlight this merger of ethical attorney-client-
privilege concerns with concerns about employees' expectations of privacy in
email communications.
A. Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc.
In Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc.,152 the New Jersey Supreme Court
reviewed the realities of employee expectations of privacy and confidentialit) in
communications made on an employer-provided device to an attorney. After
resigning from her employment, Marina Stengart filed a lawsuit against her
former employer, Loving Care Agency, Inc. (Loving Care), alleging constructive
discharge, retaliation, and harassment among other things. 4 Before Stengart's
employment with Loving Care ended, she sent several emails to her attorney
from her personal Yahoo account on a company-provided laptop in which she
complained about how her employer had treated her.' Stengart never saved her
personal email password on the computer and never sent an email to her attorney
from the company provided email system. However, unbeknownst to
Stengart, all of her personal emails were saved to the hard drive of the laptop. '
After Stengart tendered her resignation and filed suit, Loving Care emloyed a
computer forensic specialist to preserve Stengart's laptop hard drive. The
computer forensic specialist obtained access to the emails in question by
reviewing cached web site pages saved on the laptop after Stengart visited those
pages to access her private email account. 159
Stengart was unaware that Loving Care had obtained the emails until
discovery when Loving Care's attorneys used information from the emails to
reply to Stengart's first set of interrogatories.160 Stengart's attorney, asserting
attorney-client privilege, sought return of the emails and applied for an order to
the appropriate course of action under the particular facts at hand."); see also N.H. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010) (requiring the additional duty to not examine documents that the
attorney knows were inadvertently sent under the New Hampshire rule as compared to the Model
Rule). More recently, Federal Rule of Evidence 502 was enacted as a result of the growth of
electronic data and the need to guard against potentially harmful effects if privileged information
was inadvertently disclosed though electronic discovery. Klinefelter, supra note 1. at 28-30
(describing events leading to the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 and how that Rule
strikes a balance regarding inadvertent disclosure through electronic discovery by looking at factors
such as "whether [the] lawyer [took] reasonable precautions against inadvertent disclosure and
whether overall fairness would be better served by waiver or maintenance of the privilege" under
the circumstances at issue).
152. 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 20 10).
153. Id at 655.
154. Id
155. Id at 656.
156. Id
157. Id at 655-56.
158. Id at 656.
159. Id
160. Id
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show cause. which the trial court converted to a motion and thereafter denied. 161
The appellate court reversed the trial court and directed Loving Care's attorneys
to return the emails and delete any record of them. 162 Loving Care appealed, and
the issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether an employee has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in emails between her and her attorney when
the employee sent the emails from a company-owned laptop but only used the
employee's personal, password-protected email account.
On appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, Loving Care argued that either
Stengart had waived any privacy and attorney-client-privilege rights pursuant to
Loving Care's computer use policy when she sent the emails while using the
company laptop or the privilege had never attached.164 Loving Care's computer
use policy: (1) reserved for Loving Care the right to review, intercept, audit, etc.,
any matters on the "company's media systems and services at any time," (2)
declared emails, voicemails, Internet use, etc., would be considered company
property, but (3) allowed "occasional personal use." 165 The policy also expressly
prohibited certain criminal uses, but the policy failed to disclose that personal
emails would be saved on the hard drive. 166 Stengart, in turn, argued that she
was not given notice that emails from her personal, password-protected email
account would be subject to the policy. 167 The court examined two key issues:
(1) "the adequacy of the notice provided by the [p]olicy" and (2) the public
policy concern with preserving the attorney-client privilege.168
The court found the scope of the policy "not entirely clear." 69 First, the
policy used general language and failed to define the terms "media systems and
services." Also, the policy failed to mention personal email and did not warn
the employees that any emails would be saved to the hard drive. Furthermore,
the court noted that it would be unreasonable to assert that merely because a
client emailed her attorney from a company computer, the client waived the
privilege.172 The court continued its analysis by referring to section 652B of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and to treatment of this issue by other courts.1
After noting that the computer policy did not place Stengart on notice that
her employer would retrieve her personal emails, the court examined Stengart's
161. Id at 65 6 57.
162. Id at 657.
163. Id at 655.
164. Id at 658.
165. Id at 657.
166. Id
167. Id at 658.
168. Id at 659.
169. Id
170. Id
171. Id
172. See id. at 660. 664.
173. Id at 660-63.
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actions to protect the communications. 7 4 The court acknowledged that Stengart
was careful not to send messages from the company email account and that she
never saved her Yahoo password or username on the laptop.1' The court found
under these circumstances, where the policy did not place her on notice and she
attempted to protect the communications, Stengart could not be held to have
waived her privacy rights.' 6 Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court explained
that every email situation does not always warrant privacy protection for
employees. 77 Employers can ban personal use, expressly tell employees that
personal emails will be logged and reviewed, or discipline employees for
inappropriate use of electronic communications consistent with a properly
disclosed Internet policy." Therefore, merely asserting ownership of an
electronic device and its contents, without more, does not remove employee
expectations of privacy.1 9  Thus, in this case, Loving Care should have
immediately notified its adversary of its possession of the emails.1SO
B. Holmes v. Petrovich Development Co.
In Holmes v. Petrovich Development Co.,1s Gina Holmes filed suit against
her former employer alleging sexual harassment, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, wrongful termination, retaliation, and violation of her right to
privacy.is2 Holmes started her employment as an executive assistant in early
June 2004. The next month, Holmes told her employer that she was pregnant,
the baby would be due the first week of December, she was planning to work up
to her due date, and she would be out for six weeks of maternity leave following
her pregnancy.184 On August 6, 2004, after her employer expressed the need to
find and train Holmes's temporary replacement, Holmes notified her employer
that she would need her maternity leave to start in mid-November instead of
December and would require four months of maternity leave instead of six
weeks.185
Holmes's employer responded shortly thereafter inquiring as to how far
along in her pregnancy Holmes reall was when she interviewed for the position
and asserted that he felt deceived. 86 Holmes responded with a long email
174. Md at 663.
175. Id
176. Id at 665.
177. Id
178. Id
179. See id
180. Id at 666.
181. 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878 (Ct. App. 2011).
182. Id at 882.
183. Id at 883.
184. Id at 884.
185. Id
186. Id
2012] 353
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
describing her problems with prior pregnancies and asked her employer if he
wanted her to quit. 187 The employer asserted that he still wanted to employ
Holmes but needed honesty from all employees. By August 10, 2004, they
agreed to move forward. However, Holmes later became upset when she
learned that her employer had forwarded her email to other employees. 190 On
the same day she told her employer that they should move forward in "a positive
direction," Holmes used her company computer to send emails to an attorney.
She resigned the next day, and in September 2005, she filed a lawsuit against the
employer.192
As part of her claim for violation of privacy, Holmes asserted that her
employer had illegally disseminated her "highly personal" emails to other
employees.1 93 Further, Holmes alleged that the emails she sent to her attorney
from the company computer were protected under the attorney-client
privilege.194 The employer filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that
Holmes had failed to state a claim because the emails sent on the company
computer were not private.195 The trial court denied the motion, but at trial, a
verdict was entered in favor of the employer.196 On appeal, Holmes contended
that the trial court erred by: (1) denying her demand for the return of the emails
between her and her attorney; (2) permitting the employer to introduce the
emails at trial; and (3) "giving a limiting instruction that undermined her [claim]
for invasion of privacy.
The appellate court in Holmes referenced the employer's computer policy,
which "direct[ed] employees that the company's technology resources should be
used only for company business and that employees are prohibited from sending
or receiving personal e-mails." 198  Further, the court highlighted that "the
handbook warns that '[e]mployees who use the Company's Technology
Resources to create or maintain personal information or messages have no right
of privacy with respect to that information or message."' 1 99 As a result, the court
concluded that Holmes had no expectation of privacy in her emails because the
computer policy placed her on notice that the emails could be accessed by the
employer.
187. Id at 884-85.
188. 1 at 885-86.
189. Id at 886.
190. Id
191. Id
192. Id at 887.
193. Id
194. Id at 893-94.
195. Id at 887.
196. Id at 888.
197. Id at 893.
198. Id at 883.
199. Id (alteration in original).
200. Id at 896.
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As a final highlight, the court in Holmes used a tantalizing analogy to
explain its ruling. The court compared Holmes's use of the company computer
to communicate with her attorney through emails as similar to "consulting her
attorney in one of defendants' conference rooms, in a loud voice, with the door
open. yet unreasonably expecting that the conversation overheard by [her
employer] would be privileged." Pursuant to the same reasoning it used to
find that Holmes had no reasonable expectation of privacy, the court rejected
Holmes' other related privacy claims, Holmes's jury instruction challenge, and
Holmes' request for sanctions. 202
C. Convertino v. United States Department of Justice
In Convertino v. United States Department of Justice,203 the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia found that although Jonathan Tukel,
an Assistant United States Attorney, had used his employer's computer and his
work email in making communications to his private attorney, those email
communications were still subject to attorney-client-privilege protection.
According to the court, the employee "reasonably expected" that his emails
would be confidential because he was unaware of the fact that his employer
would be reviewing emails sent from his account.205 Moreover, the court found
that the employer, the Department of Justice, had a policy of allowing personal
use of an employee's email account.206 As evident from the different rulings in
Stengart, Holmes, and Convertino, case law on the issue of accessing attorney-
client communications stored on employer computers is split. These cases have
not yielded a clear rule, and the appropriate analysis appears to depend on the
specific facts in each case.207
201. Id. It is the author's view that the court's analogy in Holmes about consulting an attorney
in one of the employer's conference rooms has merit when assessing the reality of employee
privacy expectations regarding emails to an attomey found on an employer-provided device. See
infra Part VI. But the court's application of this analogy in Holnes was wrong when it injected
hyperbole about speaking in "a loud voice, with the door open, yet unreasonably expecting that the
conversation overheard by [her employer] would be privileged." Hohes, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 896;
see infra Part V1.
202. Holmes, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 893-900.
203. 674 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2009).
204. Id at 110.
205. Id
206. Id.
207. Of these cases, the Stengart decision may suggest more of a concern given it involved
access by an employer of an employee's private email system as compared to an employee's use of
the employer's own email system. See Holmes, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 896 (distinguishing Stengart on
the basis that Stengart involved use of a personal, web-based email of an employee, not the use of
the employer's own email system).
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D. California Ethics Opinion No. 2010-179: 4ttorneys Beware and Protect
Given the concerns about protecting the attorney-client privilege relating to
cyberspace communications, it is not surprising that jurisdictions are starting to
address this issue through ethics opinions. Unfortunately, the efforts have been
aimed at placing more burdens on attorneys to defend against hackers, snoops,
scavengers, and electronic dumpster-divers rather than protecting the
communications despite offensive efforts to obtain the information. 208 The State
Bar of California Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct issued
Formal Opinion No. 2010-179209 to address an attorney's ethical duties when
accessing public wireless networks while using a company-provided computer.
The opinion states that attorneys. pursuant to their duty of confidentiality and
competence, "should consider the following before using a specific [wireless]
technology": (1) "[the attorney's ability to assess the level of security afforded
by the technology"; (2) "[w]hether reasonable precautions may be taken when
using the technology to increase the level of security"; (3) the limitations on
third party access and monitoring; (4) the legal ramifications of a third party
accessing information under privacy and wiretap laws; (5) the level of sensitivity
of the information involved; (6) the potential level of detriment to the client from
inadvertent disclosure through the technology; (7) the urgency of the need to use
the technology in question; and (8) whether specific client instructions were
violated.210 At a minimum, the California Ethics opinion suggests that lawyers
should ensure that they have some type of encryption-protected Wi-Fi if they
intend to access confidential client work files while using laptops and other
digital devices when at home or in the general public.211
Despite imposing increased expectations on attorneys to protect the
confidentiality of cyberspace communications, the opinion also acknowledges
the existence of attorney-client privileges even when there is a general
understanding that wireless communications may be viewed by outsiders-a
position supported by a 1999 ABA ethics opinion.m Nevertheless, this
California ethics opinion matches a trend of requiring attorneys to take on more
208. See, e.g., Cal. State Bar Comm. on Prof'l. Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 2010-
179 (2010) [hereinafter Cal. Formal Ethics Op. 2010-179], available at http://ethics.calbar.ca.go/'
LinkClick.aspx'fileticket-wmqECiHp7h4%o3d&tabid=837 (addressing the issue of whether "an
attorney violates the duties of confidentiality and competence ... by using technology to transmit or
store confidential client information when the technology may be susceptible to unauthorized access
by third parties").
209. See id.
210. Id. at 3-6 (citations omitted).
211. See id. at 7; Eric B. Evans et al., California Bar Clarifies Rules Governing Wireless
Network Use, MAYER BROWN (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.mayerbrown.compublications/California-
Bar-Clarifies-Rules-Governing-Wireless-Network-Use-02-09-2011/.
212. See Cal. Formal Ethics Op. 2010-179, supra note 208, at 3-4 (JA]ttorneys have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in email communications, even if unencrypted, 'despite some risk
of interception and disclosure.'" (quoting ABA Opinion 99-413, supra note 19, at 1101:188)).
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responsibility to protect the confidentiality of cyberspace communications
without addressing the realistic expectations of their clients, who desire to
communicate via electronic devices. Therefore, this opinion makes it slightly
more difficult for those seeking to expand the privacy rights of employees who
use an employer-provided digital device to make and receive what should be
confidential and privileged communications over wireless networks.
E. ABA Ethics Opinion 11-459: More Burdens on Attorneys to Protect
Confidentiality ojEinail Communications
In 1999, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
concluded that sending unencrypted emails via the Internet between an attorney
and client did not violate the attorney's ethical duty to maintain client
confidentiality.214 On August 4, 2011. the ABA issued two additional formal
opinions discussing the ethical responsibilities of attorneys with respect to
protecting client confidences when communicating with a client by email215 and
when receiving email communications between a third party and their
attorney. 216 With the concern that employers may access an employee's email
communications, ABA Opinion 11-459 recommends that an attorney "should
instruct the employee-client to avoid using a workplace device or system for
sensitive or substantive communications, and perhaps for any attorney-client
communications, because even seemingly ministerial communications involving
matters such as scheduling can have substantive ramifications." 217
ABA Opinion 11-459 takes no position as to the substantive law question of
whether electronic communications made through a workplace device to an
attorney by an employee can be protected by the attorney-client privilege.218
However, ABA Opinion 11-459 does place the ethical obligation on the
employee's attorney to "assume that an employer's internal policy allows for
access to the employee's e-mails sent to or from a workplace device or
213. See Cal. Formal Ethics Op. 2010-179, supra note 208, at 7.
214. See ABA Opinion 99-413, supra note 21, at 1101:181 ("[T]he mode of transmission for
unencrypted emails affords a reasonable expectation of privacy from a technological and legal
standpoint."); see also Comerford, supra note 9, at 636 n.53 (stating the same finding as in ABA
Opinion 99-413 that lawyers "may transmit information relating to the representation of a client by
unencrypted e-mail sent over the Internet without violating the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ... because the mode of transmission affords a reasonable expectation of privacy from a
technological and legal standpoint"); Hill, supra note 9, at 21 (citing ABA Opinion 99-413, supra
note 21, at 1101:181; Del. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profi Ethics, Op. 2001-2 (2001); Me. ProfI
Ethics Comm'n, Op. 194 (2008)) (describing the ABA's conclusion in Opinion 99-413).
215. See ABA Opinion 11-459, supra note 3.
216. See ABA Opinion 11-460, supra note 3.
217. See ABA Opinion 11-459, supra note 3, at 3.
218. See id. ("[W]e express no view on whether, and in wIhat circumstances, an employee's
communications with counsel from the employee's workplace device or system are protected by the
attorney-client privilege.").
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system."219 Additionally, this opinion places an ethical obligation on the
attorney representing an employee to "ascertain . . . whether there is a significant
risk that the client will use a business e-mail address for personal
communications or whether the employee's position entails using an employer's
device." 220
ABA Opinion 11-459 not only requires that the attorney counsel the
employee-client against using workplace devices and work email to
communicate with the attorney, but it also demands that the attorney cease email
communications with the client if the client appears to have not adhered to the
attorney's advice. It is understandable that the ABA would give such
guidance, as it is attempting to protect the attorney-client privilege in an area
where state law obligations have resulted in uncertainty as to the expectation of
privacy in email communications on employer-provided devices. However,
ABA Opinion 11-459 may place an employee's attorney in an antagonistic
relationship with the attorney's client if the client has to jump through unrealistic
hoops to communicate with the attorney without using an employer-provided
device as demands on employees to be digitally available all day for
communication with their employers have expanded significantly.
F. ABA Ethics Opinion 11-460: Employer Retrieval of Employee Emails to
Their Attorney Is Not Inadvertent Disclosure
In an effort to specifically address an employer's review of an employee's
email communications with an attorney, the ABA's Standin 22Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued Opinion 11-460. Specifically,
the opinion addresses the following hypothetical scenario:
After an employee files a lawsuit against her employer, the employer
copies the contents of her workplace computer for possible use in
defending the lawsuit, and provides copies to its outside counsel. Upon
review, the employer's counsel sees that some of the employee's e-mails
bear the legend "Attorney-Client Confidential Communication." Must
the employer's counsel notify the employee's lawyer that the employer
,223has accessed this correspondence?
219. Id
220. Id
221. Id. at 4 n.7 ("Of course, if the lawyer becomes aware that a client is receiving personal e-
mail on a workplace computer or other device owned or controlled by the employer, then a duty
arises to caution the client not to do so, and if that caution is not heeded, to cease sending messages
even to personal e-mail addresses.").
222. See ABA Opinion 11-460, supra note 3.
223. Id. at 1.
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According to ABA Opinion 11-460. Model Rule 4.4(b)-which addresses an
attorney's obligation to notify the sender of an inadvertent disclosure-does not
apply to this scenario because "a document is not 'inadvertently sent' when it is
retrieved by a third person from a public or private place where it is stored or
left." 224 Although one might imply a duty of the employer's attorney to notify
the employee or the employee's attorney of the receipt of email communications
between the employee and the employee's attorney-even under the scenario
discussed-and some courts have made such a finding,225 ABA Opinion 11-460
interprets Model Rule 4.4(b) as creating a limit on the circumstances when an
attorney has a duty to notify the opposing attorney of the "inadvertent"
communications.226 Because the scenario where an employer retrieves emails
sent to an employee's attorney from an employer-provided device does not
involve an inadvertent communication according to Opinion 11-460, the opinion
227further concludes that Model Rule 4.4(b) cannot apply. Instead, Opinion 11-
460 makes clear that any duties regarding the handling of the employee's emails
to the employee's attorney that are provided by the employer to its attorney must
be determined by state law. 8
However, Opinion 11-460 goes even further by addressing the duties of the
employer's attorney who operates in a jurisdiction where the legal duty to report
the retrieval of the employee's email is unclear. According to Opinion 11-
460, the employer's attorney may have an ethical obligation to not report the
retrieval of the employee's email pursuant to Model Rule 1.6(a), which states
that "information relating to the representation of [the] client" must be kept
confidential unless there is an exception to the confidentiality requirement or the
client gives "informed consent" to make a disclosure.230 Model Rule 1.6(b) does
allow the employer's attorney to reveal the retrieval of the employee's emails to
the employee's attorney if the employer's attorney reasonably believes
disclosure is "necessary . . . to comply with other law or a court order."231
But, according to ABA Opinion 11-460, if there is no clear law that applies,
the employer's attorney will have to keep the retrieval of the employee's emails
confidential unless the employer consents to disclosing the retrieval.232 The
opinion does note that it may be advantageous to the employer to communicate
224. 1 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011)).
225. See id. at 1 2 (quoting Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Lear Corp., 270 F.R.D. 392, 398 (N.D.
Ill. 2010)) (citing Stengart v. Loving Care Agency. Inc., 990 A.2d 650. 666 (NJ. 2010)).
226. Id at 2 3 (citing ABA Comm. on Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006).
reprinted in ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDICT: ETHICS OPINIONS
2001-2005, at 1201:174, :175 (2006) [hereinafter ABA Opinion 06-440]; ABA Opinion 06-442,
supra note 15, at 1301:103); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011)).
227. Id at 3.
228. Id
229. Id
230. Id (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2011)).
231. Id (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6) (2011)).
232. Id
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the retrieval of the employee's emails to a court so that it may rule on the
admissibility of the emails and whether they may be used by the employer and
the employer's attorney. 2 While also recognizing that a court's discovery
disclosure requirements may require an employer's attorney to notify the
employee's attorney of the retrieval of the employee's emails, ABA Opinion 11-
460 makes clear that the Model Rules do not require such a notification. 234
G. The Overall ABA Ethics Approach and Its August 2012 Changes
ABA Opinions 11-459 and 11-460 continue a conservative trend by the
ABA in adopting ethics opinions regarding electronic data communications that
place the host of ethical burdens on the employee's attorney to prevent the
technical mining of this data. Further, the approach of these opinions seems to
countenance employer attempts to use advanced technology and computer
forensics experts to dumpster-dive and sift through data to find confidential
communications never intended to be communicated to the employer. Initially,
the ABA had been quite liberal about protecting electronic communications
when it found, in 1999, that unencrypted attorney-client emails were protected,
confidential communications even if they could be hacked and discovered by
outsiders.235 But in 2006. the ABA started to become more conservative about
protecting electronic communications when it decided that an attorney could
ethically mine electronic documents to find confidential communications that
might be disclosed inadvertently through embedded metadata and placed the
ethical burden on the employee's attorney to prevent any disclosure. 6
Under ABA Opinion 11-460 and ABA Opinion 11-459, the employee's
attorney now has an even greater ethical duty and technical obligation to protect
the confidentiality of email communications. The attorney must even confront
an employee client and discontinue communicating with that client if email
communications from the client have come from an employer-provided device,
regardless of the client's desires or ability to communicate with the attorney
through any other means. In contrast to the obligations of the employee's
attorney under the ABA's recent ethical approach to protecting electronic
communications, the employer's attorney has no ethical obligation to notify the
employee's attorney of the retrieval of the employee's emails or seek a court
determination of the admissibility before using the emails. Rather, the
employer's attorney is limited only by other legal restraints in the jurisdiction
233. Id
234. Id
235. See ABA Opinion 99-413, supra note 21, at 1101:181 to :182 (identifying ain expectation
of privacy in email communications between attorneys and clients).
236. See ABA Opinion 06-442, supra note 15. at 1301:104.
237. ABA Opinion 11-459, supra note 3. at 3-4.
238. ABA Opinion 11-460, supra note 3, at 2 3 (citing ABA Opinion 06-440, supra note 226,
at 1201:175; MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011)).
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involved.239 Absent clarity regarding legal requirements on disclosure, the
ABA's ethics opinions even go to the opposite extreme by implying that it may
be an ethical violation for the employer's attorney to disclose the retrieval of the
employee's emails.240 Accordingly, this Article calls for states and their attorney
ethics committees to adopt a new paradigm that employee emails-if clearly
intended to be kept confidential, such as when made to an attorney-should be
presumed private and confidential communications even if retrieved by an
employer from an employer-provided device.
At its August 2012 meeting, the ABA continued its conservative approach of
placing more burdens on the attorney representing an employee regarding
technology advances as opposed to the attorney representing an employer who
dumpster-dives and mines for data intended to be kept confidential. Specifically,
based upon recommendations from its Commission on Ethics 20/20, the ABA
adopted changes to the Model Rules by creating a new Rule 1.6(c) to require that
a lawyer "make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized
disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the
representation of a client."241 While it is reasonable to expect that an attorney
have competency in technology, the changes do not address attorney efforts to
mine for confidential data or dumpster-dive. The following language added to
comment 18 for Model Rule 1.6(c) does recognize that an attorney may not be
able to prevent some disclosures and that actions intended to prevent disclosures
that would "adversely affect the lawyer's ability to represent clients" should be
considered:
The unauthorized access to. or the inadvertent or unauthorized
disclosure of, [confidential] information ... does not constitute a
violation of paragraph (c) if the lawyer has made reasonable efforts to
prevent the access or disclosure. Factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's efforts include, but are
not limited to, the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of
disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of
employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the
safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the
lawyer's ability to represent clients (e.g., by making a device or
important piece of software excessively difficult to use).2T
239. Id at 3 (citing ABA Opinion 06-442, supra note 15, at 1301:103).
240. Id (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF CONDUCT R. 1.6(a), (b)(6) (2011)).
241. See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDiCT R. 1.6(c) (2012), available at http://www.amer
icanibar.org/groups/professional responsibility/publications/model rules ofjprofessional corduct/rule 1
6 confidentiality of information.html (amended by 20/20 RESOLUTION, supra note 145, at 4).
242. Id. cnt. 18, available at http://www.amnericanbar.org/groups/professional responsi
bility/publications/model rules of professional conduct/rule I 6 confidentiality of information/
comment on rule I 6.html.
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Further, the ABA changed the language in Model Rule 4.4(b) to include
"electronically stored information"243 and "metadata"244 as part of the
information that could be inadvertently disclosed and would require the
receiving attorney to notify the sending attorney if such information was clearly
sent inadvertently. 245 While recognizing that ABA Opinion 06-442 fails to place
any burdens on an attorney regarding an obligation to refrain from mining for
metadata or dumpster-diving and to return any data discovered in this fashion
despite findings by other jurisdictions to the contrary, the 20/20 Commission
continued the ABA's refusal to address and deter the behavior of employers-by
increasing the ethical obligations on their attorneys-when they electronically
dumpster-dive and obtain private and confidential data through forensics
experts.246 Only courts, legislatures, and attorney ethics committees can address
employer electronic dumpster-diving for private and confidential employee
emails and other electronic information given that the ABA has chosen to
sidestep the matter in its rules and ethics opinions.
V. ASSUMING EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY AS A NEW PARADIGM
When an employer accesses EST that an employee has placed in a mobile
digital device provided to the employee by his or her own employer, concerns
abound about whether the employer has invaded the employee's privacy. 2
Most employers use some form of an electronic communications policy as an
attempt to circumvent the invasion of privacy legal concern by getting
243. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2012), available at http://www.amer
icanibar.org/groups/professional responsibility/publications/model rules of professional-conduct/rule_4
4 respect for rights of third_persons.html.
244. See id. cnt. 2, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsi
bility/publications/model rulesof professionaI conduct/rule 4 4 respectfoirrightsof thirdpersons/
comment on rule 4 4.html.
245. See 20/20 RESOLUTION. supra note 145, at 54.
246. See JAMIE S. GORELICK & MICHAEL 'TRAYNOR, ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20,
REPORT 105A 6 (2012), available at http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/files flutter/1340
913956 31 1 1 9 resolution summary.doc ("The new language about metadata [in comment 2 to
Rule 4.4(b)] does not resolve a more controversial question: whether a lawyer should be permitted
to look at metadata in the absence of consent or court authority to do so. .... The Commission's
proposal does not resolve this issue.").
247. See Zielinski, supra note 5. at 71-72 (describing legal concerns for employers related to
employee personal use of electronic devices); Dave Zielinski, Editorial, Don't Overlook Legal,
Privacv Issues, HR MAG., Feb. 2012, available at http://www.shim.org/Publications/hr
magazine/EditorialContent/2012/0212/Pages/0212techa.aspx (describing legal problems including
data confidentiality, security. and privacy issues); see also MATHIASON ET AL., supra note 136, at
8 9 (citing ETHICS RES. CTR., 2011 NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY: WORKPLACE ETHICS IN
TRANSITION 30 (2012), available at http://www.ethics.org/nbes/files/'FinaINBES-web.pdt)
(describing legal concerns for employers wvhen employees merge their electronic devices for
personal use with work use and how expectations of privacy and the moral attitudes of workers
change regarding use of those devices depending on whether they are more frequent users of social
media).
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employees to consent to any invasions that may occur and by purportedly
removing their expectation of privacy by obtaining employee agreement that the
electronic communications on the employer-provided devices are owned by the
employer.248 But, the employer may get into legal trouble by gathering EST that
the employee has left on an employer-provided device and using that
information to access the employee's communications on private systems. For
example, finding an employee's personal email address and password on a
company computer and using that information to access the employee's private
email suggests illegal and improper action.249
Instead of addressing employee expectations on a case-by-case basis-as the
Ortega plurality suggests-for Fourth Amendment matters, courts, legislatures,
and attorney ethics committees should adopt a general understanding about an
employee's expectation of privacy in email communications. This
understanding assumes that if employers provide employees with mobile,
electronic devices and expect those employees to use those devices while outside
the workplace, employees will expect to also make some private
communications on those devices. As Quon suggests, employers cannot just
rely on clearly defined policies; they must also consistently apply those
policies. The fagade effectuated by adhesion policies-regarding device
use-that attempt to suggest employees have no expectation of privacy in
communications found on employer devices and have also consented to
248. See Computer Software Tracking and Counting Keystrokes-Do Fhey Violate Employee
Privacy Rights?, EMP'T L. UPDATE (Rutkowski & Associates Inc., Evansville, Ind.), Dec. 2011, at
4, available at Westlaw, 25 No. 12 EMP. L. UPDATE 4 (2011): see also Zielinski, supra note 247
(advising employers to use an electronic communication policy to circumvent privacy issues).
249. Peerce & Shapiro, supra note 32, at 16-17 (citing Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior
Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 552-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2008): Stengart v. Loving Care
Agency. Inc., 990 A.2d 650. 656-64 (NJ. 2010)). In Pure Power Boot Camp, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York found that ain employers access of a former
employee's private email by using a password left on employer's computer and use of that
information to access the former employee's personal email, as well as his email at his new place of
employment, was a violation of the SCA. Pure Poier Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
Likewise, in Stengart, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that a privilege violation resulted
when the employer's attorney reviewed cached web pages of the former employee's
communications with her attorney on her personal email account, which were left on the employer's
computer, and that the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in those communications.
Stengart, 990 A.2d at 663.
250. This approach adheres to the conclusion that Justice Scalia reached in the first step of his
analysis as described in his opinion in Ortega. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 732 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
251. See Philip M. Berkowitz, Legal Challenges Arise to 'Bring Your Own Device' Policies.,
N.Y. L.J., July 12, 2012, at 4 (describing how many employers "have adopted formal policies that
permit employees to use their personal mobile devices to create, store, and transmit work-related
data"); see also MATHIASON ET AL., supra note 136, at 6-7 (referring to a cost benefit approach
that has led many employers to allow employees to use their personal devices at work).
252. See Justin Conforti, Comment, Somebody's Watching Me: Workplace Privacy Interests,
Technology Surveillance, and the Ninth Circuit's Misapplication of the Ortega Test in Quon v. Arch
Wireless, 5 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REv. 461, 485 (2009).
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employer searches for employee communications found on those devices as a
legal paradigm should now be clearly rejected. In following the approach of
Justice Scalia in Ortega, the legal paradigm applicable to this analysis should
represent a categorical acceptance of the employee's expectation of privacy in
email communications even if made and found on employer-provided devices.25
This understanding should apply in both constitutional and private sector
analysis. Then the real analysis can focus on whether the intrusion into the
private aspects and information that an employee may reasonably expect to be
kept private is a reasonable intrusion under the circumstances. Although the
question of what framework should be employed to address the reasonableness
of any employer intrusion upon employee expectations of privacy in email
communications found on employer-provided devices is beyond the scope of this
Article, employer intrusions conducted to investigate sexual harassment claims
or determine appropriate costs in using devices, when narrowly tailored, would
appear to be reasonable intrusions. On the other hand, employer attempts to
access private communications, stored on employer-provided equipment, to
advance a position in a lawsuit would not appear to be reasonable intrusions.
Using Stengart as the template for defining the expectation of privacy,
courts can apply a broad acceptance of employee expectations of privacy when
analyzing communications from employees on employer-provided mobile
devices. As a result, the analysis of cases involving privacy expectations can
focus on whether the employer's actions in intruding upon the employee's
privacy expectations were reasonable.25 Any employee will certainly be
concerned about the consequences of using a digital device provided by an
employer. These employees will also be concerned about whether they can try
to keep communications made on that device private and confidential.256
Merging privacy protections for public employees and private employees into a
253. See, e.g., id. at 474, 491 (citing Ortega, 480 U.S. at 729-30 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment)) (referring to case-by-case approach in Ortega's plurality and rejection of Scalia's
categorical approach as a methodology that courts have applied to allow employers to diminish
employees privacy rights). A categorical acceptance of an expectation of privacy that cannot be
diminished through a device-use policy would not preclude a finding that an expectation of privacy
in a particular case was not reasonable on other grounds, such as when communications involve a
tort. See, e.g., CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1023 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (finding that unauthorized and unsolicited email communications constituted the tort of
trespass to chattels by damaging the reputation and goodwill of a business with its customers).
254. See Brabham, supra note 80, at 1020 (citing Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990
A.2d 650, 655 (N.J. 2010)) (asserting that Stengart represented a more expansive treatment of
employee expectations ofprivacy than had generally been applied in the courts).
255. Id. at 1017 (citing City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619. 2630 (2010)) (referring to
how the Court in Guon sidestepped the reasonable expectation of privacy issue by focusing on the
narrower issue of whether the police department had a legitimate business interest in reviewing the
employee's text messages).
256. See Joseph 0. Oluvole, Teacher Cell Phone Searches in Light of Ontario v. Quon, 17
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 6, at 21 22 (2010), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v17i2/"article6.pdf (discussing
privacy concerns of teachers who have been issued cell phones by their school district employers).
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coherent paradigm would also represent an important step in the advancement of
technology and privacy in the workplace.257
VI. CONCLUSION: EMPLOYEE PRIVACY IN COMMUNICATIONS ON EMPLOYER-
PROVIDED DEVICES MUST FocUs ON EMPLOYER REASONABLENESS
INSTEAD OF EMPLOYEE EXPECTATIONS
This Article has focused on identifying employees' reasonable expectations
of privacy when making personal and private communications even though they
are stored on an employer-provided electronic device. The mobile nature of
these devices encourages an increasing merger of work-related and private
communications. Some employers have started to understand and accept the
reality that use of these devices will lead to employees making personal
communications that they expect will remain private.
However, the current legal paradigm allows an employer to remove any
expectation of privacy or create an assumption that employees have consented to
any intrusion by an employer in scenarios where the employer has established a
clear policy notifying the employee that the employer may review the
information. Unfortunately, that paradigm does not comport with the realities of
the increasingly digital workplace. Instead of getting bogged down by the stilted
and unrealistic assumption that employees have no expectation of privacy even
in an email communication to their own attorneys, the analysis should focus on
whether employers in a particular situation had a legitimate reason to access the
email information and whether they utilized that access in a reasonable fashion.
Attorney-client-privilege analysis has suggested a new paradigm where after the
employer and its attorney recognize that an email communication is intended as
a private and confidential communication, such as a communication to the
employee's attorney, the employer should not be able to use the communication
unless a court determines the communication was not privileged and
confidential.
Most cases, from a constitutional analysis of the Fourth Amendment to an
analysis of statutes and common law invasion of privacy torts, permit an
employer to access its own digital equipment without liability when acting
reasonably. Accordingly, reasonable employer intrusions are always protected,
even if the circumstances suggest an employee clearly had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in information stored on an employer's electronic device.
The law should not encourage an employer to dumpster-dive for electronic
communications obviously intended to be confidential and private
communications inder the guise of asserting that employee privacy rights have
been subsumed by the mandates of employer policies. Given the realities of the
257. See Laura B. Pincus & Clayton Trotter, The Disparity Between Public and Private Sector
Employee Privacy Protections: .4 Call for Legitimate Privacy Rights for Private Sector WIorkers, 33
Am. Bus. L.J. 51, 81-82 (1995).
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digital workplace, the new paradigm should also include an expansion of ethics
law to place obligations on employers and their attorneys to disregard these
communications and return them immediately to employees, absent a court
finding to the contrary.
Using the development of attorney-client-privilege analysis as a tool to
address the growing merger of private and work-related communications on
employer-provided devices supports the approach of assuming that employees
still have reasonable expectations of privacy regarding information left on these
devices. Broadly applying this approach will remove the current paradigm and
the assertion of the resulting sham that employees have actually consented when
an employer imposes, as a condition of employment, the obligation to let an
employer search digital devices and acknowledge that the employer owns all
information on that device.
Instead, the analysis of privacy protections in the workplace should presume
reasonable intent and expectations of the employee, as occurs with attorney-
client-privilege analysis. This analysis assumes, as a matter of law, that
employees would not leave private communications on their employer-provided
electronic devices without having some expectation of privacy in those
communications. Then, the focus of the analysis would shift to whether the
employer's actions in accessing and reviewing private, non-work-related
information, left by an employee on an employer-provided device, was
reasonable and necessary under the circumstances. The assumption would be
that such an intrusion would not be reasonable simply because the employer
required the employee to agree to a computer-use policy that grants the employer
the authority to make the intrusion. Therefore, an employer would not be so
easily encouraged to dumpster-dive for private and confidential employee
communications embedded on employer-provided devices. The expansive
demands of technological innovations and the increasing expectation that an
employee be available to communicate through these employer-provided devices
as a job duty supports the general expectation that employees will also use those
devices to make personal and private communications.
Furthermore, incorporating attorney-client-privilege analysis only helps to
support the expansive nature of employee communications made through these
devices. Recent ABA ethics opinions represent a new privacy hurdle to
overcome. These opinions place additional burdens on an employee's attorney
to protect against employer mining of the data while making it more
advantageous for the employer and the employer's counsel to dumpster-dive for
this information. As a result, states, legislatures, and their attorney ethics
committees must adopt a new paradigm that recognizes an expectation of
privacy and confidentiality in emails to attorneys even when found on, or made
with, employer-provided devices.
In concluding, it is helpful to return to the scenario discussed at the
beginning of the Article where Bobbi has made email communications to an
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attorney who represents her in an arbitration involving sexual harassment
charges against her supervisor.258 In Hohnes, the California appellate court
suggested an employee's email communications to an attorney on the employer's
computer were analogous to an employee meeting with her attorney in one of the
employer's conference rooms.2 59 That part of the Hohnes analogy works well
for Bobbi, who will likely use her employer's conference room to meet with her
attorney as she is still employed there and her attorney is representing her in an
arbitration proceeding in which her employer might even be paying her
attorney's fees. 260
Unlike the hyperbole used in applying the conference room analogy in
Holmes, which suggested that the employee had opened the door to the
employer's conference room and yelled when communicating via email on the
employer's computer, a more realistic application of the conference room
analogy should be employed. When an employee must constantly be available
to communicate via email, through employer-provided computers and other
electronic devices, and the employee uses the employer's conference room
(analogous to the employer-provided electronic device) for both work-related
and private communications, the conference room could be viewed as having a
glass window where the employer can certainly see into the room. In looking
through that conference room window, the employer can clearly see that the
employee is communicating with her attorney. Similarly, when analogizing the
electronic device to the conference room, upon viewing titles and an overview of
electronic file information, the employer can clearly see what information is not
work-related and involves private, personal, and even attorney-client-privileged
communications.
Also, if desired, the employer could attempt to listen to what the employee is
communicating to her attorney inside the conference room, whether it is yelled
or not. But when the employer sees through the window (the title of messages,
to whom the messages are addressed, whether an attorney is involved in the
communication, or if a privilege is identified) and realizes that the employee is
meeting with her own attorney in that conference room, the employer will know
258. See supra Part I.
259. See Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878, 896 (Ct. App. 2011) (finding
that Holmes was aware that the employer-provided computer was not private and was accessible to
her employer, and by still using the computer to communicate with her attorney. her actions were
"akin to consulting her attorney in one of defendants' conference rooms, in a loud voice, with the
door open, yet unreasonably expecting that the conversation overheard [by the employer] would be
privileged").
260. It may appear unusual to suggest that an employer would enter into an agreement with an
employee to arbitrate aiy disputes while also funding the employees legal counsel, but a number of
companies do agree to these transactions. See, e.g., Michael Z. Green, Ethical Incentives fbi
Employers in Adopting Legal Service Plans to Handle Employment Disputes, 44 BRANDEIS L.J.
395. 409-13 & n.105 (2006) (describing a specific legal service plan that was offered to employees
to obtain legal counsel for arbitration proceedings and referring to other companies providing for
such ain arrangement).
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that those communications are private, confidential, and privileged. The law
should not encourage the employer to spy or electronically dumpster dive to
mine for email information that the employer would normally not be allowed to
use because it is clearly intended to be private and confidential.261
Further, the employer will know that although it might be able to stand near
the door of the conference room and listen to those communications, the
employer's attorney has an ethical obligation to not listen to those
communications when it knows they are privileged and protected. Bobbi is not
opening the door to that conference room; nor is she yelling. She is merely using
the employer's conference room to have her private communication with her
attorney. The realities of the current digital workplace provide Bobbi with little
opportunity to communicate with her lawyer or have sufficient private
communications off the employer's premises-without using the employer-
provided digital device.
By applying the conference room analogy in this way, the analysis of
Bobbi's problem at the beginning of this Article will shift to a focus on whether
it was reasonable for the employer to extract the communications sent to her
attorney from the employer-provided laptop. The question of whether Bobbi had
a reasonable expectation of privacy will not arise because that expectation is
presumed within the analytical paradigm asserted in this Article. By
accomplishing this shift in the analysis, the dispute will center on the realities of
the digital workplace and not on an employer-induced removal of an expectation
of privacy through an Internet communication or employer-provided-device
usage policy.
Consequently, employers will be limited in their insistence that employees
use employer-provided devices to communicate at all times while also
mandating successfully that none of the employees' communications can be
protected as private. Under this analysis, employers will no longer be
encouraged to dumpster-dive for confidential and private employee email
communications on an employer-provided device once a dispute arises. As soon
as the employer can clearly see that the communications were intended to be
private and confidential, such as emails to an attorney, and there is no reasonable
justification to intrude upon the privacy of the employee or to assert that the
employee waived any privacy expectations, the employer must refrain from
using an employee's private email communications.
261. See Wingo, supra note 13, at 215 ("Because dumpster diving is aIn unethical and
destructive practice, [the] owners [of the information] should not be abandoned to protect
themselves exclusively through security measures such as guards, electronic surveillance and paper
shredders[, as this abandonment and focus on one's owvn private protection] is the moral equivalent
of abandoning homeowners to private protection against burglary. Society should make the moral
statement that dumpster diving is wrong and will not be tolerated .7... ).
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